Files
vpd-permission-poc/sql/adb/13_dds_variant.sql
devmrko 1f4a9c7e64 Wire DDS variant into run.sh as optional subcommands
Adds dds / dds-setup / dds-tests / dds-teardown subcommands so the
26ai Deep Data Security variant can be run from the same one-click
entry point. Not part of `./run.sh all` since DDS requires 26ai
(23.26.2+) which not every ADB has.

- sql/adb/14_tests_dds_user.sql: shared verification script for all
  4 ddsuser_*; uses WHENEVER SQLERROR CONTINUE so the expected
  ORA-00942 (deny-by-hiding) doesn't abort the script. Includes
  bypass attempts against the underlying VPD views, raw DB Links,
  and the VPD permission tables.
- sql/adb/15_dds_cleanup.sql: idempotent teardown for DDS objects
  (data grants, end users, data roles, dds_db_role, DDS-only views).
- run.sh: do_dds_prereq / do_dds_setup / do_dds_tests /
  do_dds_teardown helpers; dispatch case extended.

Also fixes a pre-existing secrets-leak gap: both 07_end_users.sql
and 13_dds_variant.sql had SET DEFINE ON without SET VERIFY OFF,
which causes sqlplus to echo the substituted DDL (including the
IDENTIFIED BY <password> clause) on the `new 1:` line. Added
SET VERIFY OFF.

E2E re-verified on ADB 23.26.2.2.0: matrix identical to manual run
(MY=17 / PG=12 / BOTH=12+17 / NONE=ORA-00942 on both), no password
in logs, dds-teardown leaves no residue.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-26 15:53:15 +09:00

193 lines
7.9 KiB
SQL

-- ============================================================
-- 13_dds_variant.sql (OPTIONAL — Oracle 26ai Deep Data Security)
-- ============================================================
-- Reimplements the same 4-user source-access matrix as the VPD
-- path (06_policy.sql + 07_end_users.sql), but using Oracle Deep
-- Data Security (DDS) — the declarative SQL successor to VPD/RAS
-- introduced in Oracle AI Database 26ai (announced 2026-04-09).
--
-- Matrix (identical to VPD demo):
-- user PG view MySQL view
-- -------------- ----------- -----------
-- DDSUSER_MY blocked ALL rows
-- DDSUSER_PG ALL rows blocked
-- DDSUSER_BOTH ALL rows ALL rows
-- DDSUSER_NONE blocked blocked (no data role = default deny)
--
-- ============================================================
-- PREREQUISITES (verify before running)
-- ------------------------------------------------------------
-- * Oracle AI Database 23.26.2 or later
-- * COMPATIBLE init parameter >= 20.0
-- * ADMIN holds: CREATE END USER, CREATE DATA ROLE, GRANT DATA
-- ROLE, CREATE DATA GRANT system privileges (ADMIN gets them
-- by default on ADB; on on-prem you may need to grant).
--
-- Check version + COMPATIBLE before running:
-- SELECT banner_full FROM v$version;
-- SELECT value FROM v$parameter WHERE name = 'compatible';
-- ============================================================
-- COEXISTENCE NOTE
-- ------------------------------------------------------------
-- This script creates *new* end users with the `ddsuser_` prefix
-- so it does NOT collide with the VPD demo users (`vpduser_*`).
--
-- It also creates **dedicated DDS-only views** (`v_dds_customers_pg`,
-- `v_dds_customers_my`) — separate from the VPD demo's
-- `v_customers_pg`/`v_customers_my`. Reason: the VPD views have a
-- live `DBMS_RLS` policy that returns `1=0` for any session whose
-- LOGON trigger didn't load the VPD application context — i.e. for
-- our DDS end users. Putting DDS Data Grants on top of the VPD
-- views would silently return 0 rows (DDS allows but VPD blocks).
-- Dedicated views with no VPD policy let DDS be the sole gatekeeper.
--
-- We deliberately do NOT enable `SET USE DATA GRANTS ONLY` on the
-- DDS views in this demo — but doing so is the recommended
-- production posture (single declarative policy plane).
--
-- DEFINE: &DDSUSER_MY_PASSWORD, &DDSUSER_PG_PASSWORD,
-- &DDSUSER_BOTH_PASSWORD, &DDSUSER_NONE_PASSWORD
-- ============================================================
SET ECHO OFF
SET FEEDBACK ON
SET DEFINE ON
SET VERIFY OFF -- 비번이 'new 1:' 라인으로 echo 되는 것을 막음 (leak 방지)
PROMPT === 0. Creating DDS-only views (no VPD policy attached) ===
-- Functionally identical to v_customers_pg / v_customers_my but
-- kept separate so that DDS Data Grants are the sole authority.
CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW v_dds_customers_pg AS
SELECT "customer_id" AS customer_id,
"full_name" AS full_name,
"email" AS email,
"signup_date" AS signup_date,
"region" AS region
FROM "public"."customers"@RDS_POSTGRES_LINK;
CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW v_dds_customers_my AS
SELECT "customer_id" AS customer_id,
"full_name" AS full_name,
"email" AS email,
"signup_date" AS signup_date,
"region" AS region
FROM "ecommerce_poc"."customers"@RDS_LINK;
PROMPT === 1. Creating local END USERs (schemaless, no objects) ===
-- End users in DDS do not own a schema and cannot create objects.
-- They authenticate, then receive access purely via DATA GRANTs.
CREATE END USER "ddsuser_my" IDENTIFIED BY "&DDSUSER_MY_PASSWORD";
CREATE END USER "ddsuser_pg" IDENTIFIED BY "&DDSUSER_PG_PASSWORD";
CREATE END USER "ddsuser_both" IDENTIFIED BY "&DDSUSER_BOTH_PASSWORD";
CREATE END USER "ddsuser_none" IDENTIFIED BY "&DDSUSER_NONE_PASSWORD";
PROMPT === 2. Creating DATA ROLEs + connection role for direct logon ===
-- Per the DDS direct-logon pattern: a standard ROLE carries
-- CREATE SESSION, then that standard role is granted to each
-- data role so end users can actually connect.
CREATE ROLE dds_db_role;
GRANT CREATE SESSION TO dds_db_role;
CREATE DATA ROLE my_only_role;
CREATE DATA ROLE pg_only_role;
CREATE DATA ROLE both_sources_role;
-- A "connect only" data role for ddsuser_none — they need to be able
-- to log in (so we can prove "authenticated but no data visible"),
-- but they must hold NO data grants. END USERs can't be grantees of
-- a regular ROLE directly (ORA-01917) — connection privilege must
-- flow through a DATA ROLE.
CREATE DATA ROLE connect_only_role;
GRANT dds_db_role TO my_only_role;
GRANT dds_db_role TO pg_only_role;
GRANT dds_db_role TO both_sources_role;
GRANT dds_db_role TO connect_only_role;
PROMPT === 3. Mapping end users to data roles ===
GRANT DATA ROLE my_only_role TO "ddsuser_my";
GRANT DATA ROLE pg_only_role TO "ddsuser_pg";
GRANT DATA ROLE both_sources_role TO "ddsuser_both";
GRANT DATA ROLE connect_only_role TO "ddsuser_none";
PROMPT === 4. Creating DATA GRANTs (the declarative equivalent of the VPD policy) ===
-- These five lines replace the entire vpd_region_filter PL/SQL
-- function + the per-row lookups against the `permission` table.
-- Each grant is a single declarative SQL statement.
-- DDSUSER_MY -> ALL rows from v_customers_my, no PG access.
CREATE DATA GRANT admin.dds_my_only_grant_mysql
AS SELECT
ON admin.v_dds_customers_my
TO my_only_role;
-- DDSUSER_PG -> ALL rows from v_customers_pg, no MY access.
CREATE DATA GRANT admin.dds_pg_only_grant_pg
AS SELECT
ON admin.v_dds_customers_pg
TO pg_only_role;
-- DDSUSER_BOTH -> both views.
CREATE DATA GRANT admin.dds_both_grant_pg
AS SELECT
ON admin.v_dds_customers_pg
TO both_sources_role;
CREATE DATA GRANT admin.dds_both_grant_mysql
AS SELECT
ON admin.v_dds_customers_my
TO both_sources_role;
-- DDSUSER_NONE: NO data grant -> default deny.
PROMPT === 5. (Optional) Region row-level filter DDS-style ===
-- The VPD path stores allowed_regions in a `permission` table and
-- builds the predicate at query time. DDS makes this a declarative
-- WHERE clause directly on the grant. Example: restrict
-- both_sources_role to APAC only on the PG view. Uncomment to try.
--
-- CREATE OR REPLACE DATA GRANT admin.dds_both_grant_pg
-- AS SELECT
-- ON admin.v_dds_customers_pg
-- WHERE region = 'APAC'
-- TO both_sources_role;
--
-- For multi-region, use IN-list (no CSV-splitting helper needed,
-- unlike the VPD policy):
--
-- CREATE OR REPLACE DATA GRANT admin.dds_both_grant_mysql
-- AS SELECT
-- ON admin.v_dds_customers_my
-- WHERE region IN ('APAC','EMEA')
-- TO both_sources_role;
PROMPT === 6. (Optional) Column masking DDS-style ===
-- The VPD path uses a separate Data Redaction policy
-- (06a_redaction.sql) to NULL out the email column. DDS folds this
-- into the grant itself with ALL COLUMNS EXCEPT — one statement
-- handles both row filter AND column mask.
--
-- CREATE OR REPLACE DATA GRANT admin.dds_both_grant_pg
-- AS SELECT (ALL COLUMNS EXCEPT email)
-- ON admin.v_dds_customers_pg
-- TO both_sources_role;
--
-- Excluded columns return NULL (same UX as redaction), but it's
-- one declarative grant instead of (policy function + redaction
-- policy + permission table row).
PROMPT === DDS variant ready ===
-- ------------------------------------------------------------
-- Verify with:
-- sqlplus '"ddsuser_pg"'/<pw>@<service>
-- SQL> SELECT ORA_END_USER_CONTEXT.username FROM dual;
-- SQL> SELECT COUNT(*) FROM admin.v_dds_customers_pg; -- expect 12
-- SQL> SELECT COUNT(*) FROM admin.v_dds_customers_my; -- expect ORA-00942
-- (DDS hides the object entirely when no grant exists — note this is
-- stronger than VPD which would return "0 rows" for the same case.)
--
-- Audit the grants:
-- SELECT * FROM dba_data_grants;
-- SELECT * FROM dba_data_roles;
-- SELECT * FROM dba_end_users;
-- ------------------------------------------------------------
EXIT;