1f4a9c7e64
Adds dds / dds-setup / dds-tests / dds-teardown subcommands so the 26ai Deep Data Security variant can be run from the same one-click entry point. Not part of `./run.sh all` since DDS requires 26ai (23.26.2+) which not every ADB has. - sql/adb/14_tests_dds_user.sql: shared verification script for all 4 ddsuser_*; uses WHENEVER SQLERROR CONTINUE so the expected ORA-00942 (deny-by-hiding) doesn't abort the script. Includes bypass attempts against the underlying VPD views, raw DB Links, and the VPD permission tables. - sql/adb/15_dds_cleanup.sql: idempotent teardown for DDS objects (data grants, end users, data roles, dds_db_role, DDS-only views). - run.sh: do_dds_prereq / do_dds_setup / do_dds_tests / do_dds_teardown helpers; dispatch case extended. Also fixes a pre-existing secrets-leak gap: both 07_end_users.sql and 13_dds_variant.sql had SET DEFINE ON without SET VERIFY OFF, which causes sqlplus to echo the substituted DDL (including the IDENTIFIED BY <password> clause) on the `new 1:` line. Added SET VERIFY OFF. E2E re-verified on ADB 23.26.2.2.0: matrix identical to manual run (MY=17 / PG=12 / BOTH=12+17 / NONE=ORA-00942 on both), no password in logs, dds-teardown leaves no residue. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
78 lines
3.3 KiB
SQL
78 lines
3.3 KiB
SQL
-- ============================================================
|
|
-- 07_end_users.sql
|
|
-- Create the FOUR end-user accounts with MINIMAL privileges.
|
|
-- Add a LOGON trigger that loads each user's context automatically.
|
|
-- Run as ADMIN.
|
|
--
|
|
-- DEFINE: &VPDUSER_MY_PASSWORD, &VPDUSER_PG_PASSWORD,
|
|
-- &VPDUSER_BOTH_PASSWORD, &VPDUSER_NONE_PASSWORD
|
|
-- ============================================================
|
|
SET ECHO OFF
|
|
SET FEEDBACK ON
|
|
SET DEFINE ON
|
|
SET VERIFY OFF -- 비번이 'new 1:' 라인으로 echo 되는 것을 막음 (leak 방지)
|
|
|
|
PROMPT === Creating end-user accounts ===
|
|
-- Passwords come from .env (DEFINE) so they aren't hardcoded in source.
|
|
-- Production should use IAM / proxy auth / mTLS instead of static passwords.
|
|
CREATE USER vpduser_my IDENTIFIED BY "&VPDUSER_MY_PASSWORD";
|
|
CREATE USER vpduser_pg IDENTIFIED BY "&VPDUSER_PG_PASSWORD";
|
|
CREATE USER vpduser_both IDENTIFIED BY "&VPDUSER_BOTH_PASSWORD";
|
|
CREATE USER vpduser_none IDENTIFIED BY "&VPDUSER_NONE_PASSWORD";
|
|
|
|
-- Login privilege only. No QUOTA — these users never create objects.
|
|
GRANT CREATE SESSION TO vpduser_my;
|
|
GRANT CREATE SESSION TO vpduser_pg;
|
|
GRANT CREATE SESSION TO vpduser_both;
|
|
GRANT CREATE SESSION TO vpduser_none;
|
|
|
|
PROMPT === Granting SELECT on the policy-protected views ONLY ===
|
|
-- We deliberately grant SELECT on BOTH views to all four users.
|
|
-- The VPD policy decides what they actually see — including 0 rows
|
|
-- when there is no permission row. This is what makes the demo a
|
|
-- clean security boundary: revoking access doesn't mean revoking
|
|
-- the GRANT; it means removing the row in `permission`.
|
|
GRANT SELECT ON v_customers_pg TO vpduser_my;
|
|
GRANT SELECT ON v_customers_my TO vpduser_my;
|
|
GRANT SELECT ON v_customers_pg TO vpduser_pg;
|
|
GRANT SELECT ON v_customers_my TO vpduser_pg;
|
|
GRANT SELECT ON v_customers_pg TO vpduser_both;
|
|
GRANT SELECT ON v_customers_my TO vpduser_both;
|
|
GRANT SELECT ON v_customers_pg TO vpduser_none;
|
|
GRANT SELECT ON v_customers_my TO vpduser_none;
|
|
|
|
-- ctx_pkg is bound to the secure context; calling it is harmless
|
|
-- (the package always loads ONLY the caller's own permissions).
|
|
GRANT EXECUTE ON ctx_pkg TO vpduser_my;
|
|
GRANT EXECUTE ON ctx_pkg TO vpduser_pg;
|
|
GRANT EXECUTE ON ctx_pkg TO vpduser_both;
|
|
GRANT EXECUTE ON ctx_pkg TO vpduser_none;
|
|
|
|
-- NOTE on what we are deliberately NOT granting:
|
|
-- * NO grant on app_user / permission / etc. -> users can't read who-can-see-what
|
|
-- * NO grant on the underlying @dblink tables -> can't bypass the view
|
|
-- * NO grant on DBMS_RLS -> can't alter/drop the policy
|
|
-- * NO EXEMPT ACCESS POLICY -> can't escape VPD
|
|
-- * NO CREATE TABLE / CREATE MATERIALIZED VIEW -> can't snapshot filtered data
|
|
-- * NO DBA / PDB_DBA / RESOURCE roles -> least privilege
|
|
|
|
PROMPT === Creating LOGON trigger that auto-loads context ===
|
|
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER vpd_logon_trg
|
|
AFTER LOGON ON DATABASE
|
|
BEGIN
|
|
-- Only fire for our application end-users. ADMIN logons keep normal behavior.
|
|
IF SYS_CONTEXT('USERENV','SESSION_USER') IN
|
|
('VPDUSER_MY','VPDUSER_PG','VPDUSER_BOTH','VPDUSER_NONE') THEN
|
|
admin.ctx_pkg.init;
|
|
END IF;
|
|
EXCEPTION
|
|
WHEN OTHERS THEN
|
|
-- Never block login on a context-loading error; fail closed (no perms loaded
|
|
-- means policy returns 1=0, i.e. no rows). Log if you have an audit table.
|
|
NULL;
|
|
END;
|
|
/
|
|
|
|
PROMPT === End-users ready ===
|
|
EXIT;
|