Files
devmrko 68d53dc5a9 Initial commit — VPD Permission POC (clone-and-go)
ADB-centered row-level access control across heterogeneous DB sources
(AWS RDS Postgres + MySQL) using Oracle VPD + Data Redaction +
Secure Application Context, packaged as a one-click demo.

Mechanism:
- LOGON trigger calls ctx_pkg.init once per session to load the user's
  allowed regions from the permission mapping tables into a Secure App
  Context (VPD_CTX, USING ctx_pkg).
- VPD policy function vpd_region_filter reads SYS_CONTEXT and returns
  an IN-list predicate (or '1=0' for fail-closed, NULL for '*'),
  which Oracle injects into every SELECT on the protected views.
- Data Redaction reuses the same context to mask PII (email, full_name)
  when the allowed-regions value is not '*'.
- 5 documented bypass attempts (direct DB link SELECT, SET_CONTEXT
  spoof, DBMS_RLS drop, mapping table SELECT) all blocked by GRANT
  scoping + DEFINER rights on ctx_pkg.

One-click entrypoint:
- ./run.sh {prereq|source|adb|tests|audit|all|teardown}
- Source DDL (Postgres + MySQL customers + 12-row seed each) is
  applied via local psql/mysql; ADB-side setup via sqlplus with .env
  values injected as SQL*Plus DEFINE substitutions.

Verified E2E on ADB 26ai + AWS RDS PG + RDS MySQL (mysql_community
gateway) on 2026-05-26: VPDUSER_A sees only APAC rows (PG 2 / MySQL 6,
PII masked), VPDUSER_B sees all (PG 12 / MySQL 17, PII unmasked).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-26 14:03:32 +09:00
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