[Developer] #619 focus POC on KB VPD permissions

docs/design/619-stakeholder-token-permission-example/README.md

@@ -13,40 +13,40 @@
 - `CB_AGENT_BEARER_KEY.STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID`가 `KB_STAKEHOLDERS.USER_ID`를 가리킨다. 기존 숫자형 `USER_ID`는 기존 기능 호환용 application-user bridge로 유지한다.
 - 이해당사자마다 `CB_APP_USER.STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID` bridge를 하나 만들고, `KB_STAKEHOLDERS.ROLE`이 `지점장`이면 `KB_BRANCH_MANAGER_ROLE`, `설계사`이면 `KB_DESIGNER_ROLE`을 부여한다. 다른 역할은 토큰은 발급되지만 별도 권한을 추가하기 전까지 fail-closed다.
 - VPD package는 토큰에서 `STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID`, `STAKEHOLDER_ROLE`, 정규화된 `STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL`을 application context에 설정한다. `설계사채널 → 설계사`, `GA채널 → GA`를 정규화한다.
-- `지점장` 여부는 package의 하드코딩 분기가 아니라 `KB_BRANCH_MANAGER_ROLE`의 rule value(`지점장`)와 `KB_STAKEHOLDERS.ROLE` 일치로 결정한다. 설계사 분기는 같은 방식으로 `설계사`를 확인한다.
+- 토큰의 업무 역할은 `KB_STAKEHOLDERS`에서 한 번 해석해 context에 넣고, 그 역할에 매핑된 `CB_PERMISSION`이 어떤 조건 코드를 사용할지 결정한다. filter predicate에 업무 역할명은 직접 저장하지 않는다.
-- `RLS_FILTER`의 문자열은 실행하지 않는다. 권한 테이블에 저장된 allowlist rule type만 predicate로 변환한다.
+- 행 규칙은 두 가지다. allowlist condition code는 secure context 값으로 치환하고, `STATIC_SQL`은 현재 보호 객체 컬럼만 사용하는 검증된 정적 WHERE 조건식을 그대로 추가한다.
 
 ## 3. 예제 권한
 
 | 역할 | 보호 객체 | 행 규칙 | 결과 |
 |---|---|---|---|
-| KB_DESIGNER_ROLE | KB_CONTRACTS | `FC_ID / STAKEHOLDER_SELF` | 본인 담당 계약 |
+| KB_DESIGNER_ROLE | KB_CONTRACTS | `FC_ID / OWN_CONTRACT` | 본인 담당 계약 |
-| KB_BRANCH_MANAGER_ROLE | KB_CONTRACTS | `FC_CHANNEL / STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL` | 같은 채널 계약 |
+| KB_BRANCH_MANAGER_ROLE | KB_CONTRACTS | `FC_CHANNEL / CHANNEL_CONTRACT` | 같은 채널 계약 |
-| KB_DESIGNER_ROLE | 고객·담보·청구·외부보유 | `CUST_ID / STAKEHOLDER_SELF` | 본인 담당 고객 기준 |
+| KB_DESIGNER_ROLE | 고객·담보·청구·외부보유 | `CUST_ID / OWN_CUSTOMER` | 본인 담당 고객 기준 |
-| KB_BRANCH_MANAGER_ROLE | 고객·담보·청구·외부보유 | `CUST_ID / STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL` | 같은 채널 고객 기준 |
+| KB_BRANCH_MANAGER_ROLE | 고객·담보·청구·외부보유 | `CUST_ID / CHANNEL_CUSTOMER` | 같은 채널 고객 기준 |
-| 두 역할 | KB_STAKEHOLDERS | `USER_ID / STAKEHOLDER_SELF` | 토큰 주체 자신의 매핑 행 |
+| KB_STAKEHOLDER_IDENTITY_ROLE | KB_STAKEHOLDERS | `USER_ID / TOKEN_SUBJECT` | 토큰 주체 자신의 매핑 행 |
 
-`STAKEHOLDER_SELF`와 `STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL`은 접근 규칙 화면에서 선택 가능한 행 규칙이다. 두 규칙에는 대상 컬럼과 업무 역할값을 함께 저장한다. Bearer Token을 해석할 때 `KB_STAKEHOLDERS`를 한 번만 조회해 `STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID`, `STAKEHOLDER_ROLE`, `STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL` secure context를 만들고, 이후 `FC_ID`/`FC_CHANNEL`과 `CUST_ID`/`CONTRACT_NO` 조건은 계약원장과 그 context만 사용한다. 허용된 역할별 분기는 **OR**로 합쳐진다.
+`OWN_CONTRACT`, `CHANNEL_CONTRACT`, `OWN_CUSTOMER`, `CHANNEL_CUSTOMER`, `TOKEN_SUBJECT`는 접근 규칙 화면에서 선택하는 filter 조건 코드다. Bearer Token을 해석할 때 `KB_STAKEHOLDERS`를 한 번만 조회해 `STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID`, `STAKEHOLDER_ROLE`, `STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL` secure context를 만들고, VPD filter가 condition code를 대상 object의 WHERE 조각으로 확장한다.
+
+각 접근 규칙 안에서는 치환된 condition code와 `STATIC_SQL`을 **AND**로 합친다. 예를 들어 `본인 담당 고객 / CUST_ID`에 `CONTRACT_STATUS = '정상'` 정적 조건을 더하면, 담당 고객이면서 상태가 정상인 행만 허용된다. 서로 다른 ALLOW 권한(역할/권한 세트)은 **OR**, DENY 권한은 최종 허용 결과에서 제외한다. `STATIC_SQL`은 세미콜론·주석·서브쿼리·다른 테이블 참조를 차단하고 현재 보호 객체의 컬럼과 allowlist SQL 연산자만 허용한다.
 
 ```sql
--- 고객·청구·외부보유의 CUST_ID 예시: 역할별 허용 분기
+-- 고객·청구·외부보유의 CUST_ID 예시: permission condition code 확장 결과
 EXISTS (
   SELECT 1
   FROM POC_2.KB_CONTRACTS c
   WHERE c.CUST_ID = <현재행>.CUST_ID
-    AND SYS_CONTEXT('CB_AGENT_CTX', 'STAKEHOLDER_ROLE') = '설계사'
     AND c.FC_ID = SYS_CONTEXT('CB_AGENT_CTX', 'STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID')
 )
 OR EXISTS (
   SELECT 1
   FROM POC_2.KB_CONTRACTS c
   WHERE c.CUST_ID = <현재행>.CUST_ID
-    AND SYS_CONTEXT('CB_AGENT_CTX', 'STAKEHOLDER_ROLE') = '지점장'
     AND c.FC_CHANNEL = SYS_CONTEXT('CB_AGENT_CTX', 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL')
 )
 ```
 
-위의 `'설계사'`/`'지점장'`은 함수 하드코딩이 아니라 각 permission rule의 `rule_value`에서 온다. 토큰 원문은 predicate에 노출하지 않으며, `CB_AGENT_BEARER_KEY → KB_STAKEHOLDERS`에서 한 번 검증·해석한 subject context만 사용한다.
+어느 분기를 사용할지는 token context에 매핑된 effective role의 permission이 결정한다. 토큰 원문은 predicate에 노출하지 않으며, `CB_AGENT_BEARER_KEY → KB_STAKEHOLDERS`에서 한 번 검증·해석한 subject context만 사용한다.
 
 ## 4. CLS / NULL 처리
 
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ Bearer Token → CB_AGENT_CTX_PKG → application context
 - [x] 설계사 역할은 `FC_ID = stakeholder user_id`와 담당 고객 범위 규칙으로 등록된다.
 - [x] 지정 7개 민감 컬럼은 원문 표시 예외가 없으면 NULL 처리하는 VPD column policy가 등록된다.
 - [x] 토큰 없음·역할 없음·지원하지 않는 rule mapping은 VPD filter에서 `1 = 0`으로 fail-closed 된다.
+- [x] 조건 코드와 정적 SQL 조건은 같은 접근 규칙 안에서 AND로 결합되며, 정적 SQL은 단일 안전 조건식만 저장할 수 있다.
 
 ## 7. 검증 계획
 
@@ -103,5 +104,5 @@ Bearer Token → CB_AGENT_CTX_PKG → application context
 ## 8. 리스크와 제한
 
 - `CB_APP_USER`는 업무 원장이 아니라 permission engine용 bridge다. 업무 identity의 원천은 반드시 `KB_STAKEHOLDERS`다.
-- `RLS_FILTER`는 사람이 읽는 설명으로만 보존한다. 저장된 SQL을 실행하면 rule injection 위험이 있으므로 사용하지 않는다.
+- 정적 SQL은 백오피스 검증과 VPD 함수의 이중 검증을 통과한 단일 조건식만 사용한다. 임의 SQL, 주석, 바인드, 서브쿼리, 다른 테이블 참조는 허용하지 않는다.
 - 지점장의 “집계만” 요구는 원시 행 조회를 완전히 차단하는 별도 집계 View/ORDS endpoint가 필요하다. 이번 예제는 채널 행 범위와 민감 컬럼 NULL 처리까지 구현하며, 집계 전용 endpoint는 후속 범위다.

sql/adb/17_agent_ords_security_local_vpd_setup.sql

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ CREATE TABLE cb_permission_rule (
   perm_id     NUMBER NOT NULL REFERENCES cb_permission(perm_id),
   rule_column VARCHAR2(128),
   rule_type   VARCHAR2(30) NOT NULL,
-  rule_value  VARCHAR2(100)
+  rule_value  VARCHAR2(1000 CHAR)
 );
 
 CREATE TABLE cb_permission_column (

sql/adb/26_agent_ords_security_dynamic_vpd_filter.sql

@@ -6,8 +6,9 @@
 --   CB_AGENT_CTX.USER_ID -> direct CB_USER_ROLE + group CB_USER_GROUP/CB_GROUP_ROLE
 --   -> CB_PERMISSION -> CB_PERMISSION_RULE
 -- and builds a row predicate for the object passed by DBMS_RLS.
--- Supported rule types include TAG. TAG matches a token in a comma-delimited
+-- A permission's rules are combined with AND.  Separate ALLOW permissions are
--- TECH_TAG value, allowing the vector search view to remain one row per chunk.
+-- combined with OR and DENY permissions are subtracted at the end.  This lets
+-- a token-context condition be narrowed by a literal static SQL condition.
 -- ============================================================
 WHENEVER SQLERROR EXIT SQL.SQLCODE
 SET ECHO OFF
@@ -27,6 +28,10 @@ AS
   v_target     VARCHAR2(128);
   v_allow_predicate VARCHAR2(32767);
   v_deny_predicate  VARCHAR2(32767);
+  v_active_permission_id NUMBER;
+  v_active_permission_effect VARCHAR2(10);
+  v_permission_predicate VARCHAR2(32767);
+  v_permission_invalid BOOLEAN := FALSE;
 
   FUNCTION quote_literal(p_value IN VARCHAR2) RETURN VARCHAR2 IS
   BEGIN
@@ -64,7 +69,79 @@ AS
       RETURN NULL;
   END;
 
-  PROCEDURE append_or(p_effect IN VARCHAR2, p_clause IN VARCHAR2) IS
+  FUNCTION safe_static_predicate(
+    p_owner       IN VARCHAR2,
+    p_table_name  IN VARCHAR2,
+    p_predicate   IN VARCHAR2
+  ) RETURN VARCHAR2 IS
+    v_predicate  VARCHAR2(32767) := TRIM(p_predicate);
+    v_lexical    VARCHAR2(32767);
+    v_token      VARCHAR2(128);
+    v_index      PLS_INTEGER := 1;
+    v_count      NUMBER;
+    v_has_column BOOLEAN := FALSE;
+  BEGIN
+    -- STATIC_SQL is intentionally an expression only: no statement
+    -- separator/comment/bind/database-link/qualified object is accepted.
+    -- Every identifier outside a string literal must be a column of the
+    -- protected object or an allowlisted SQL operator/function.
+    IF v_predicate IS NULL
+       OR LENGTH(v_predicate) > 1000
+       OR INSTR(v_predicate, ';') > 0
+       OR INSTR(v_predicate, '--') > 0
+       OR INSTR(v_predicate, '/*') > 0
+       OR INSTR(v_predicate, '*/') > 0
+       OR INSTR(v_predicate, ':') > 0
+       OR INSTR(v_predicate, '@') > 0
+       OR INSTR(v_predicate, '||') > 0
+       OR REGEXP_LIKE(v_predicate, '[[:cntrl:]]')
+       OR MOD(LENGTH(v_predicate) - LENGTH(REPLACE(v_predicate, '''', '')), 2) <> 0 THEN
+      RETURN NULL;
+    END IF;
+
+    -- Replace SQL string literals before extracting identifiers.  Doubled
+    -- quotes in a literal are supported by the expression below.
+    v_lexical := REGEXP_REPLACE(v_predicate, '''(''''|[^''])*''', ' ');
+    IF REGEXP_LIKE(v_lexical, '[[:alpha:]_$#][[:alnum:]_$#]*[[:space:]]*\.') THEN
+      RETURN NULL;
+    END IF;
+
+    LOOP
+      v_token := UPPER(REGEXP_SUBSTR(
+        v_lexical, '[[:alpha:]_$#][[:alnum:]_$#]*', 1, v_index
+      ));
+      EXIT WHEN v_token IS NULL;
+      v_index := v_index + 1;
+
+      IF v_token IN (
+          'AND', 'OR', 'NOT', 'NULL', 'IS', 'IN', 'LIKE', 'BETWEEN', 'ESCAPE',
+          'TRUE', 'FALSE', 'UPPER', 'LOWER', 'TRIM', 'NVL', 'COALESCE',
+          'TO_CHAR', 'TO_DATE', 'REGEXP_LIKE', 'INSTR', 'LENGTH', 'SUBSTR',
+          'REPLACE', 'CAST', 'AS', 'DATE', 'TIMESTAMP', 'NUMBER', 'VARCHAR2', 'CHAR'
+      ) THEN
+        NULL;
+      ELSE
+        SELECT COUNT(*)
+        INTO   v_count
+        FROM   all_tab_columns
+        WHERE  owner = UPPER(p_owner)
+        AND    table_name = UPPER(p_table_name)
+        AND    column_name = v_token;
+
+        IF v_count = 0 THEN
+          RETURN NULL;
+        END IF;
+        v_has_column := TRUE;
+      END IF;
+    END LOOP;
+
+    RETURN CASE WHEN v_has_column THEN v_predicate ELSE NULL END;
+  EXCEPTION
+    WHEN OTHERS THEN
+      RETURN NULL;
+  END;
+
+  PROCEDURE append_permission(p_effect IN VARCHAR2, p_clause IN VARCHAR2) IS
   BEGIN
     IF p_clause IS NULL THEN
       RETURN;
@@ -72,16 +149,39 @@ AS
 
     IF p_effect = 'DENY' THEN
       IF v_deny_predicate IS NULL THEN
-        v_deny_predicate := '(' || p_clause || ')';
+        v_deny_predicate := p_clause;
       ELSE
-        v_deny_predicate := v_deny_predicate || ' OR (' || p_clause || ')';
+        v_deny_predicate := '(' || v_deny_predicate || ') OR (' || p_clause || ')';
       END IF;
     ELSIF v_allow_predicate IS NULL THEN
-      v_allow_predicate := '(' || p_clause || ')';
+      v_allow_predicate := p_clause;
     ELSE
-      v_allow_predicate := v_allow_predicate || ' OR (' || p_clause || ')';
+      v_allow_predicate := '(' || v_allow_predicate || ') OR (' || p_clause || ')';
     END IF;
   END;
+
+  PROCEDURE append_rule(p_clause IN VARCHAR2) IS
+  BEGIN
+    IF p_clause IS NULL THEN
+      v_permission_invalid := TRUE;
+      RETURN;
+    END IF;
+
+    IF v_permission_predicate IS NULL THEN
+      v_permission_predicate := p_clause;
+    ELSE
+      v_permission_predicate := '(' || v_permission_predicate || ') AND (' || p_clause || ')';
+    END IF;
+  END;
+
+  PROCEDURE flush_permission IS
+  BEGIN
+    IF NOT v_permission_invalid THEN
+      append_permission(v_active_permission_effect, v_permission_predicate);
+    END IF;
+    v_permission_predicate := NULL;
+    v_permission_invalid := FALSE;
+  END;
 BEGIN
   BEGIN
     v_user_id := TO_NUMBER(SYS_CONTEXT('CB_AGENT_CTX', 'USER_ID'));
@@ -111,7 +211,8 @@ BEGIN
       ON     gr.group_id = ug.group_id
       WHERE  ug.user_id = v_user_id
     )
-    SELECT UPPER(TRIM(r.rule_type)) AS rule_type,
+    SELECT p.perm_id,
+           UPPER(TRIM(r.rule_type)) AS rule_type,
            UPPER(TRIM(r.rule_column)) AS rule_column,
            NVL(UPPER(TRIM(p.permission_effect)), 'ALLOW') AS permission_effect,
            r.rule_value
@@ -122,148 +223,135 @@ BEGIN
     ON     r.perm_id = p.perm_id
     WHERE  p.target_name = v_target
     AND    p.action_name = 'SELECT'
-    ORDER BY r.rule_id
+    ORDER BY p.perm_id, r.rule_id
   ) LOOP
+    IF v_active_permission_id IS NULL THEN
+      v_active_permission_id := r.perm_id;
+      v_active_permission_effect := r.permission_effect;
+    ELSIF v_active_permission_id <> r.perm_id THEN
+      flush_permission;
+      v_active_permission_id := r.perm_id;
+      v_active_permission_effect := r.permission_effect;
+    END IF;
+
     DECLARE
       v_column           VARCHAR2(128);
+      v_static_predicate VARCHAR2(32767);
     BEGIN
       IF r.rule_type = 'ALL' THEN
-        IF r.permission_effect = 'DENY' THEN
+        append_rule('1 = 1');
-          RETURN '1 = 0';
-        END IF;
-        v_allow_predicate := '(1 = 1)';
       ELSIF r.rule_type = 'MY_DEPT' THEN
         -- NULL rule_column keeps backward compatibility with the demo seed.
         v_column := safe_column(p_schema, p_object, NVL(r.rule_column, 'DEPT_CODE'));
         IF v_column IS NOT NULL THEN
-          append_or(r.permission_effect, v_column || ' = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''DEPT_CODE'')');
+          append_rule(v_column || ' = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''DEPT_CODE'')');
         END IF;
       ELSIF r.rule_type = 'SELF' THEN
         -- NULL rule_column keeps backward compatibility with the demo seed.
         v_column := safe_column(p_schema, p_object, NVL(r.rule_column, 'OWNER_EMP_NO'));
         IF v_column IS NOT NULL THEN
-          append_or(r.permission_effect, v_column || ' = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''EMP_NO'')');
+          append_rule(v_column || ' = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''EMP_NO'')');
         END IF;
       ELSIF r.rule_type = 'DEPT' THEN
         v_column := safe_column(p_schema, p_object, NVL(r.rule_column, 'DEPT_CODE'));
         IF v_column IS NOT NULL THEN
-          append_or(r.permission_effect, v_column || ' = ' || quote_literal(r.rule_value));
+          append_rule(v_column || ' = ' || quote_literal(r.rule_value));
         END IF;
       ELSIF r.rule_type = 'EMP_NO' THEN
         v_column := safe_column(p_schema, p_object, NVL(r.rule_column, 'OWNER_EMP_NO'));
         IF v_column IS NOT NULL THEN
-          append_or(r.permission_effect, v_column || ' = ' || quote_literal(r.rule_value));
+          append_rule(v_column || ' = ' || quote_literal(r.rule_value));
         END IF;
       ELSIF r.rule_type = 'TAG' THEN
         -- A TAG rule defaults to the ingestion metadata column TECH_TAG.
-        -- Multiple ALLOW TAG rows are accumulated by append_or, so any
-        -- matching tag grants visibility. DENY rows are accumulated
-        -- separately and removed from the final result.
         v_column := safe_column(p_schema, p_object, NVL(r.rule_column, 'TECH_TAG'));
         IF v_column IS NOT NULL
            AND r.rule_value IS NOT NULL
            AND REGEXP_LIKE(TRIM(r.rule_value), '^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$') THEN
-          append_or(
+          append_rule(
-            r.permission_effect,
             'REGEXP_LIKE(UPPER(' || v_column || '), ' ||
             quote_literal('(^|,)' || UPPER(TRIM(r.rule_value)) || '(,|$)') || ')'
           );
         END IF;
-      ELSIF r.rule_type IN ('STAKEHOLDER_SELF', 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL') THEN
+      ELSIF r.rule_type IN (
-        -- CB_AGENT_CTX_PKG가 Bearer token -> KB_STAKEHOLDERS를 한 번
+          'TOKEN_SUBJECT', 'OWN_CONTRACT', 'CHANNEL_CONTRACT', 'OWN_CUSTOMER', 'CHANNEL_CUSTOMER'
-        -- 해석해 USER_ID/ROLE/CHANNEL을 secure context로 설정한다.
+      ) THEN
-        -- 따라서 보호 테이블 predicate에서 KB_STAKEHOLDERS를 다시 조인하지
+        -- 백오피스 권한 설정의 조건 코드를 안전한 WHERE 조각으로 확장한다.
-        -- 않고, 해당 context와 KB_CONTRACTS 관계만 사용한다.
+        -- token -> stakeholder 해석은 context package가 한 번만 수행하며,
+        -- VPD filter는 context와 대상/계약원장만 쓴다.
         v_column := safe_column(p_schema, p_object, r.rule_column);
         IF v_column IS NOT NULL
            AND UPPER(p_schema) = 'POC_2' THEN
-          DECLARE
+          IF r.rule_type = 'TOKEN_SUBJECT'
-            v_contract_key  VARCHAR2(30);
-            v_role_condition VARCHAR2(500);
-          BEGIN
-            -- 각 ALLOW rule은 append_or로 OR 분기가 된다. rule_value는
-            -- 권한 설정에 저장된 해당 분기의 역할값이다. identity rule은
-            -- NULL value를 허용해 모든 토큰 주체가 자기 mapping을 해석한다.
-            v_role_condition := CASE
-              WHEN TRIM(r.rule_value) IS NULL THEN '1 = 1'
-              ELSE 'SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_ROLE'') = '
-                   || quote_literal(TRIM(r.rule_value))
-            END;
-
-            IF r.rule_type = 'STAKEHOLDER_SELF'
-               AND v_target = 'KB_CONTRACTS'
-               AND v_column = 'FC_ID' THEN
-              append_or(
-                r.permission_effect,
-                '(' || v_role_condition ||
-                ' AND FC_ID = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID''))'
-              );
-            ELSIF r.rule_type = 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL'
-                  AND v_target = 'KB_CONTRACTS'
-                  AND v_column = 'FC_CHANNEL' THEN
-              append_or(
-                r.permission_effect,
-                '(' || v_role_condition ||
-                ' AND FC_CHANNEL = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL''))'
-              );
-            ELSIF r.rule_type = 'STAKEHOLDER_SELF'
              AND v_target = 'KB_STAKEHOLDERS'
              AND v_column = 'USER_ID' THEN
-              append_or(
+            append_rule(
-                r.permission_effect,
+              'USER_ID = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID'')'
-                '(' || v_role_condition ||
-                ' AND USER_ID = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID''))'
             );
-            ELSIF v_target IN ('KB_CUSTOMERS', 'KB_COVERAGES', 'KB_CLAIMS', 'KB_EXTERNAL_HOLDINGS')
+          ELSIF r.rule_type = 'OWN_CONTRACT'
+                AND v_target = 'KB_CONTRACTS'
+                AND v_column = 'FC_ID' THEN
+            append_rule(
+              'FC_ID = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID'')'
+            );
+          ELSIF r.rule_type = 'CHANNEL_CONTRACT'
+                AND v_target = 'KB_CONTRACTS'
+                AND v_column = 'FC_CHANNEL' THEN
+            append_rule(
+              'FC_CHANNEL = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL'')'
+            );
+          ELSIF r.rule_type IN ('OWN_CUSTOMER', 'CHANNEL_CUSTOMER')
+                AND v_target IN ('KB_CUSTOMERS', 'KB_COVERAGES', 'KB_CLAIMS', 'KB_EXTERNAL_HOLDINGS')
                 AND v_column IN ('CUST_ID', 'CONTRACT_NO') THEN
+            DECLARE
+              v_contract_key VARCHAR2(30);
+              v_subject_filter VARCHAR2(500);
+            BEGIN
               v_contract_key := CASE v_column
                 WHEN 'CUST_ID' THEN 'CUST_ID'
                 WHEN 'CONTRACT_NO' THEN 'CONTRACT_NO'
               END;
-              IF r.rule_type = 'STAKEHOLDER_SELF' THEN
+              v_subject_filter := CASE r.rule_type
-                append_or(
+                WHEN 'OWN_CUSTOMER' THEN
-                  r.permission_effect,
+                  'c.FC_ID = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID'')'
-                  'EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM (' ||
-                  'SELECT c.' || v_contract_key || ' AS access_key ' ||
-                  'FROM POC_2.KB_CONTRACTS c ' ||
-                  'WHERE ' || v_role_condition ||
-                  ' AND c.FC_ID = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID'')) allowed_contract ' ||
-                  'WHERE allowed_contract.access_key = ' || v_column || ')'
-                );
                 ELSE
-                append_or(
+                  'c.FC_CHANNEL = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL'')'
-                  r.permission_effect,
+              END;
-                  'EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM (' ||
+              append_rule(
-                  'SELECT c.' || v_contract_key || ' AS access_key ' ||
+                'EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM (SELECT c.' || v_contract_key || ' AS access_key ' ||
-                  'FROM POC_2.KB_CONTRACTS c ' ||
+                'FROM POC_2.KB_CONTRACTS c WHERE ' || v_subject_filter ||
-                  'WHERE ' || v_role_condition ||
+                ') allowed_contract WHERE allowed_contract.access_key = ' || v_column || ')'
-                  ' AND c.FC_CHANNEL = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL'')) allowed_contract ' ||
-                  'WHERE allowed_contract.access_key = ' || v_column || ')'
               );
-              END IF;
-            END IF;
             END;
           END IF;
+        END IF;
+      ELSIF r.rule_type = 'STATIC_SQL' THEN
+        v_static_predicate := safe_static_predicate(p_schema, p_object, r.rule_value);
+        append_rule(v_static_predicate);
       ELSIF r.rule_type = '=' THEN
         v_column := safe_column(p_schema, p_object, r.rule_column);
         IF v_column IS NOT NULL THEN
-          append_or(r.permission_effect, 'TO_CHAR(' || v_column || ') = ' || quote_literal(r.rule_value));
+          append_rule('TO_CHAR(' || v_column || ') = ' || quote_literal(r.rule_value));
         END IF;
       ELSIF r.rule_type IN ('!=', '<>') THEN
         v_column := safe_column(p_schema, p_object, r.rule_column);
         IF v_column IS NOT NULL THEN
-          append_or(r.permission_effect, 'TO_CHAR(' || v_column || ') <> ' || quote_literal(r.rule_value));
+          append_rule('TO_CHAR(' || v_column || ') <> ' || quote_literal(r.rule_value));
         END IF;
+      ELSE
+        append_rule(NULL);
       END IF;
     END;
   END LOOP;
 
+  flush_permission;
+
   IF v_allow_predicate IS NULL THEN
     RETURN '1 = 0';
   END IF;
 
   IF v_deny_predicate IS NULL THEN
-    IF v_allow_predicate = '(1 = 1)' THEN
+    IF v_allow_predicate = '1 = 1' THEN
       RETURN '1 = 1';
     END IF;
     RETURN '(' || v_allow_predicate || ')';

sql/adb/27_agent_ords_security_dynamic_vpd_filter_test.sql

@@ -67,6 +67,12 @@ BEGIN
   INSERT INTO cb_app_user(user_id, user_name, employee_no, dept_code, can_read_contents, active)
   VALUES (456112, 'rule_test_deny_only', 'E456112', 'HR', 'N', 'Y');
 
+  INSERT INTO cb_app_user(user_id, user_name, employee_no, dept_code, can_read_contents, active)
+  VALUES (456113, 'rule_test_static_and', 'E456113', 'HR', 'N', 'Y');
+
+  INSERT INTO cb_app_user(user_id, user_name, employee_no, dept_code, can_read_contents, active)
+  VALUES (456114, 'rule_test_static_invalid', 'E456114', 'HR', 'N', 'Y');
+
   INSERT INTO cb_app_role(role_id, role_name) VALUES (456101, 'RULE_TEST_MY_DEPT');
   INSERT INTO cb_app_role(role_id, role_name) VALUES (456102, 'RULE_TEST_SELF');
   INSERT INTO cb_app_role(role_id, role_name) VALUES (456103, 'RULE_TEST_ALL');
@@ -79,6 +85,8 @@ BEGIN
   INSERT INTO cb_app_role(role_id, role_name) VALUES (456110, 'RULE_TEST_TARGET_MISMATCH');
   INSERT INTO cb_app_role(role_id, role_name) VALUES (456111, 'RULE_TEST_ALLOW_DENY');
   INSERT INTO cb_app_role(role_id, role_name) VALUES (456112, 'RULE_TEST_DENY_ONLY');
+  INSERT INTO cb_app_role(role_id, role_name) VALUES (456113, 'RULE_TEST_STATIC_AND');
+  INSERT INTO cb_app_role(role_id, role_name) VALUES (456114, 'RULE_TEST_STATIC_INVALID');
 
   INSERT INTO cb_user_role(user_id, role_id) VALUES (456101, 456101);
   INSERT INTO cb_user_role(user_id, role_id) VALUES (456102, 456102);
@@ -92,6 +100,8 @@ BEGIN
   INSERT INTO cb_user_role(user_id, role_id) VALUES (456110, 456110);
   INSERT INTO cb_user_role(user_id, role_id) VALUES (456111, 456111);
   INSERT INTO cb_user_role(user_id, role_id) VALUES (456112, 456112);
+  INSERT INTO cb_user_role(user_id, role_id) VALUES (456113, 456113);
+  INSERT INTO cb_user_role(user_id, role_id) VALUES (456114, 456114);
 
   INSERT INTO cb_permission(perm_id, role_id, target_name, action_name)
   VALUES (456101, 456101, 'CB_V_SEARCH_DOCUMENTS', 'SELECT');
@@ -132,6 +142,12 @@ BEGIN
   INSERT INTO cb_permission(perm_id, role_id, target_name, action_name, permission_effect)
   VALUES (456113, 456112, 'CB_V_SEARCH_DOCUMENTS', 'SELECT', 'DENY');
 
+  INSERT INTO cb_permission(perm_id, role_id, target_name, action_name, permission_effect)
+  VALUES (456114, 456113, 'CB_V_SEARCH_DOCUMENTS', 'SELECT', 'ALLOW');
+
+  INSERT INTO cb_permission(perm_id, role_id, target_name, action_name, permission_effect)
+  VALUES (456115, 456114, 'CB_V_SEARCH_DOCUMENTS', 'SELECT', 'ALLOW');
+
   INSERT INTO cb_permission_rule(rule_id, perm_id, rule_column, rule_type, rule_value)
   VALUES (456101, 456101, NULL, 'MY_DEPT', NULL);
 
@@ -171,6 +187,15 @@ BEGIN
   INSERT INTO cb_permission_rule(rule_id, perm_id, rule_column, rule_type, rule_value)
   VALUES (456113, 456113, 'DEPT_CODE', '=', 'HR');
 
+  INSERT INTO cb_permission_rule(rule_id, perm_id, rule_column, rule_type, rule_value)
+  VALUES (456114, 456114, 'DEPT_CODE', '=', 'HR');
+
+  INSERT INTO cb_permission_rule(rule_id, perm_id, rule_column, rule_type, rule_value)
+  VALUES (456115, 456114, NULL, 'STATIC_SQL', 'OWNER_EMP_NO = ''E456113''');
+
+  INSERT INTO cb_permission_rule(rule_id, perm_id, rule_column, rule_type, rule_value)
+  VALUES (456116, 456115, NULL, 'STATIC_SQL', 'DEPT_CODE = ''HR''; 1 = 1');
+
   COMMIT;
 END;
 /
@@ -260,6 +285,8 @@ BEGIN
   assert_contains('ALLOW_ALL_MINUS_DENY_DEPT', 456111, 'AND NOT');
   assert_contains('ALLOW_ALL_MINUS_DENY_DEPT_DETAIL', 456111, 'TO_CHAR(DEPT_CODE) = ''HR''');
   assert_equals('DENY_ONLY_DENIES', 456112, '1 = 0');
+  assert_contains('CONTEXT_AND_STATIC_SQL', 456113, 'TO_CHAR(DEPT_CODE) = ''HR'') AND (OWNER_EMP_NO = ''E456113'')');
+  assert_equals('INVALID_STATIC_SQL_DENIES', 456114, '1 = 0');
   cb_agent_ctx_pkg.clear_user;
 END;
 /

sql/adb/46_kb_stakeholder_token_permission_example.sql

@@ -383,20 +383,18 @@ BEGIN
 
   -- 토큰은 모든 이해당사자에게 발급되지만, 아래 역할이 없는 주체는
   -- 권한 레코드가 없으므로 VPD가 1=0으로 fail-closed 된다.
-  ensure_permission(v_designer_role_id, 'KB_STAKEHOLDERS', 'USER_ID', 'STAKEHOLDER_SELF', '설계사');
-  ensure_permission(v_manager_role_id,  'KB_STAKEHOLDERS', 'USER_ID', 'STAKEHOLDER_SELF', '지점장');
   ensure_permission(v_designer_role_id, 'KB_PRODUCTS', NULL, 'ALL', NULL);
   ensure_permission(v_manager_role_id,  'KB_PRODUCTS', NULL, 'ALL', NULL);
-  ensure_permission(v_designer_role_id, 'KB_CONTRACTS', 'FC_ID', 'STAKEHOLDER_SELF', '설계사');
+  ensure_permission(v_designer_role_id, 'KB_CONTRACTS', 'FC_ID', 'OWN_CONTRACT', NULL);
-  ensure_permission(v_manager_role_id,  'KB_CONTRACTS', 'FC_CHANNEL', 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL', '지점장');
+  ensure_permission(v_manager_role_id,  'KB_CONTRACTS', 'FC_CHANNEL', 'CHANNEL_CONTRACT', NULL);
-  ensure_permission(v_designer_role_id, 'KB_CUSTOMERS', 'CUST_ID', 'STAKEHOLDER_SELF', '설계사');
+  ensure_permission(v_designer_role_id, 'KB_CUSTOMERS', 'CUST_ID', 'OWN_CUSTOMER', NULL);
-  ensure_permission(v_manager_role_id,  'KB_CUSTOMERS', 'CUST_ID', 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL', '지점장');
+  ensure_permission(v_manager_role_id,  'KB_CUSTOMERS', 'CUST_ID', 'CHANNEL_CUSTOMER', NULL);
-  ensure_permission(v_designer_role_id, 'KB_COVERAGES', 'CUST_ID', 'STAKEHOLDER_SELF', '설계사');
+  ensure_permission(v_designer_role_id, 'KB_COVERAGES', 'CUST_ID', 'OWN_CUSTOMER', NULL);
-  ensure_permission(v_manager_role_id,  'KB_COVERAGES', 'CUST_ID', 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL', '지점장');
+  ensure_permission(v_manager_role_id,  'KB_COVERAGES', 'CUST_ID', 'CHANNEL_CUSTOMER', NULL);
-  ensure_permission(v_designer_role_id, 'KB_CLAIMS', 'CUST_ID', 'STAKEHOLDER_SELF', '설계사');
+  ensure_permission(v_designer_role_id, 'KB_CLAIMS', 'CUST_ID', 'OWN_CUSTOMER', NULL);
-  ensure_permission(v_manager_role_id,  'KB_CLAIMS', 'CUST_ID', 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL', '지점장');
+  ensure_permission(v_manager_role_id,  'KB_CLAIMS', 'CUST_ID', 'CHANNEL_CUSTOMER', NULL);
-  ensure_permission(v_designer_role_id, 'KB_EXTERNAL_HOLDINGS', 'CUST_ID', 'STAKEHOLDER_SELF', '설계사');
+  ensure_permission(v_designer_role_id, 'KB_EXTERNAL_HOLDINGS', 'CUST_ID', 'OWN_CUSTOMER', NULL);
-  ensure_permission(v_manager_role_id,  'KB_EXTERNAL_HOLDINGS', 'CUST_ID', 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL', '지점장');
+  ensure_permission(v_manager_role_id,  'KB_EXTERNAL_HOLDINGS', 'CUST_ID', 'CHANNEL_CUSTOMER', NULL);
 END;
 /
 COMMIT;

sql/adb/47_kb_stakeholder_permission_or_branches.sql

@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ BEGIN
       INSERT INTO cb_permission(perm_id, role_id, target_name, action_name, permission_effect)
       VALUES (v_permission_id, v_role_id, 'KB_STAKEHOLDERS', 'SELECT', 'ALLOW');
       INSERT INTO cb_permission_rule(rule_id, perm_id, rule_column, rule_type, rule_value)
-      VALUES (cb_permission_rule_seq.NEXTVAL, v_permission_id, 'USER_ID', 'STAKEHOLDER_SELF', NULL);
+      VALUES (cb_permission_rule_seq.NEXTVAL, v_permission_id, 'USER_ID', 'TOKEN_SUBJECT', NULL);
   END;
 END;
 /

sql/adb/48_kb_permission_condition_codes.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+-- ============================================================
+-- 48_kb_permission_condition_codes.sql
+--
+-- Replaces the first KB example's stakeholder-specific predicate types with
+-- policy condition codes. CB_AGENT_DOC_VPD_FILTER expands these codes into
+-- the target object's WHERE predicate.
+-- Execute as ADMIN after 25 and 46.
+-- ============================================================
+WHENEVER SQLERROR EXIT SQL.SQLCODE
+SET ECHO OFF
+SET FEEDBACK ON
+SET DEFINE OFF
+
+ALTER SESSION DISABLE PARALLEL DML;
+
+PROMPT === 1. Replacing KB example rules with filter condition codes ===
+UPDATE cb_permission_rule r
+SET rule_type = CASE
+      WHEN EXISTS (
+        SELECT 1 FROM cb_permission p JOIN cb_app_role ar ON ar.role_id = p.role_id
+        WHERE p.perm_id = r.perm_id AND ar.role_name = 'KB_DESIGNER_ROLE'
+          AND p.target_name = 'KB_CONTRACTS'
+      ) THEN 'OWN_CONTRACT'
+      WHEN EXISTS (
+        SELECT 1 FROM cb_permission p JOIN cb_app_role ar ON ar.role_id = p.role_id
+        WHERE p.perm_id = r.perm_id AND ar.role_name = 'KB_BRANCH_MANAGER_ROLE'
+          AND p.target_name = 'KB_CONTRACTS'
+      ) THEN 'CHANNEL_CONTRACT'
+      WHEN EXISTS (
+        SELECT 1 FROM cb_permission p JOIN cb_app_role ar ON ar.role_id = p.role_id
+        WHERE p.perm_id = r.perm_id AND ar.role_name = 'KB_DESIGNER_ROLE'
+          AND p.target_name IN ('KB_CUSTOMERS', 'KB_COVERAGES', 'KB_CLAIMS', 'KB_EXTERNAL_HOLDINGS')
+      ) THEN 'OWN_CUSTOMER'
+      WHEN EXISTS (
+        SELECT 1 FROM cb_permission p JOIN cb_app_role ar ON ar.role_id = p.role_id
+        WHERE p.perm_id = r.perm_id AND ar.role_name = 'KB_BRANCH_MANAGER_ROLE'
+          AND p.target_name IN ('KB_CUSTOMERS', 'KB_COVERAGES', 'KB_CLAIMS', 'KB_EXTERNAL_HOLDINGS')
+      ) THEN 'CHANNEL_CUSTOMER'
+      ELSE r.rule_type
+    END,
+    rule_value = NULL
+WHERE r.rule_type IN ('STAKEHOLDER_SELF', 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL')
+  AND EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1
+    FROM cb_permission p
+    JOIN cb_app_role ar ON ar.role_id = p.role_id
+    WHERE p.perm_id = r.perm_id
+      AND ar.role_name IN ('KB_DESIGNER_ROLE', 'KB_BRANCH_MANAGER_ROLE')
+      AND p.target_name IN ('KB_CONTRACTS', 'KB_CUSTOMERS', 'KB_COVERAGES', 'KB_CLAIMS', 'KB_EXTERNAL_HOLDINGS')
+  );
+
+COMMIT;
+
+PROMPT === 2. Keeping token subject access as an identity-only permission ===
+DECLARE
+  v_identity_role_id NUMBER;
+  v_permission_id    NUMBER;
+  v_count            NUMBER;
+BEGIN
+  BEGIN
+    SELECT role_id INTO v_identity_role_id
+    FROM cb_app_role
+    WHERE role_name = 'KB_STAKEHOLDER_IDENTITY_ROLE';
+  EXCEPTION
+    WHEN NO_DATA_FOUND THEN
+      SELECT NVL(MAX(role_id), 0) + 1 INTO v_identity_role_id FROM cb_app_role;
+      INSERT INTO cb_app_role(role_id, role_name, max_sensitivity_level)
+      VALUES (v_identity_role_id, 'KB_STAKEHOLDER_IDENTITY_ROLE', 'INTERNAL');
+  END;
+
+  FOR u IN (
+    SELECT user_id FROM cb_app_user
+    WHERE stakeholder_user_id IS NOT NULL AND active = 'Y'
+  ) LOOP
+    SELECT COUNT(*) INTO v_count
+    FROM cb_user_role
+    WHERE user_id = u.user_id AND role_id = v_identity_role_id;
+    IF v_count = 0 THEN
+      INSERT INTO cb_user_role(user_id, role_id) VALUES (u.user_id, v_identity_role_id);
+    END IF;
+  END LOOP;
+
+  -- Business roles do not need to grant the stakeholder source row. The
+  -- identity role alone lets a valid token resolve its own stakeholder row.
+  DELETE FROM cb_permission_column
+  WHERE permission_id IN (
+    SELECT p.perm_id
+    FROM cb_permission p JOIN cb_app_role ar ON ar.role_id = p.role_id
+    WHERE ar.role_name IN ('KB_DESIGNER_ROLE', 'KB_BRANCH_MANAGER_ROLE')
+      AND p.target_name = 'KB_STAKEHOLDERS'
+  );
+  DELETE FROM cb_permission_rule
+  WHERE perm_id IN (
+    SELECT p.perm_id
+    FROM cb_permission p JOIN cb_app_role ar ON ar.role_id = p.role_id
+    WHERE ar.role_name IN ('KB_DESIGNER_ROLE', 'KB_BRANCH_MANAGER_ROLE')
+      AND p.target_name = 'KB_STAKEHOLDERS'
+  );
+  DELETE FROM cb_permission
+  WHERE perm_id IN (
+    SELECT p.perm_id
+    FROM cb_permission p JOIN cb_app_role ar ON ar.role_id = p.role_id
+    WHERE ar.role_name IN ('KB_DESIGNER_ROLE', 'KB_BRANCH_MANAGER_ROLE')
+      AND p.target_name = 'KB_STAKEHOLDERS'
+  );
+
+  BEGIN
+    SELECT perm_id INTO v_permission_id
+    FROM cb_permission
+    WHERE role_id = v_identity_role_id
+      AND target_name = 'KB_STAKEHOLDERS'
+      AND action_name = 'SELECT';
+  EXCEPTION
+    WHEN NO_DATA_FOUND THEN
+      SELECT cb_permission_seq.NEXTVAL INTO v_permission_id FROM dual;
+      INSERT INTO cb_permission(perm_id, role_id, target_name, action_name, permission_effect)
+      VALUES (v_permission_id, v_identity_role_id, 'KB_STAKEHOLDERS', 'SELECT', 'ALLOW');
+  END;
+
+  DELETE FROM cb_permission_rule WHERE perm_id = v_permission_id;
+  INSERT INTO cb_permission_rule(rule_id, perm_id, rule_column, rule_type, rule_value)
+  VALUES (cb_permission_rule_seq.NEXTVAL, v_permission_id, 'USER_ID', 'TOKEN_SUBJECT', NULL);
+END;
+/
+COMMIT;
+
+PROMPT === 3. Condition codes consumed by the VPD filter ===
+SELECT ar.role_name, p.target_name, r.rule_column, r.rule_type
+FROM cb_permission p
+JOIN cb_app_role ar ON ar.role_id = p.role_id
+JOIN cb_permission_rule r ON r.perm_id = p.perm_id
+WHERE ar.role_name IN (
+  'KB_DESIGNER_ROLE', 'KB_BRANCH_MANAGER_ROLE', 'KB_STAKEHOLDER_IDENTITY_ROLE'
+)
+ORDER BY ar.role_name, p.target_name, r.rule_id;
+
+PROMPT === KB permission condition codes ready ===

sql/adb/49_permission_static_sql_condition.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+-- ============================================================
+-- 49_permission_static_sql_condition.sql
+--
+-- Makes room for a literal, static WHERE condition attached to an
+-- allowlisted permission rule.  The VPD function validates the expression
+-- again before returning it as part of a predicate.
+-- ============================================================
+WHENEVER SQLERROR EXIT SQL.SQLCODE
+SET ECHO OFF
+SET FEEDBACK ON
+SET DEFINE OFF
+
+PROMPT === Enlarging rule value for static SQL conditions ===
+DECLARE
+  v_data_length NUMBER;
+BEGIN
+  SELECT data_length
+  INTO   v_data_length
+  FROM   user_tab_columns
+  WHERE  table_name = 'CB_PERMISSION_RULE'
+  AND    column_name = 'RULE_VALUE';
+
+  IF v_data_length < 1000 THEN
+    EXECUTE IMMEDIATE
+      'ALTER TABLE cb_permission_rule MODIFY (rule_value VARCHAR2(1000 CHAR))';
+  END IF;
+END;
+/
+
+SELECT column_name, data_type, char_length
+FROM user_tab_columns
+WHERE table_name = 'CB_PERMISSION_RULE'
+  AND column_name = 'RULE_VALUE';
+
+PROMPT === Static SQL condition storage ready ===

sql/adb/51_kb_vpd_admin_token.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+-- ============================================================
+-- 51_kb_vpd_admin_token.sql
+--
+-- Creates an application-level KB VPD administrator.  This is not an
+-- EXEMPT ACCESS POLICY database account: the token is resolved to an
+-- application context and the existing VPD policy function returns ALL
+-- only because KB_VPD_ADMIN_ROLE has explicit ALL permissions.
+-- ============================================================
+WHENEVER SQLERROR EXIT SQL.SQLCODE
+SET ECHO OFF
+SET FEEDBACK ON
+SET DEFINE OFF
+SET SERVEROUTPUT ON
+
+PROMPT === Creating KB VPD administrator, permissions, and one-time token ===
+GRANT EXECUTE ON cb_agent_ctx_pkg TO POC_2;
+
+DECLARE
+  c_stakeholder_user_id CONSTANT VARCHAR2(30) := 'KB_VPD_ADMIN';
+  c_role_name           CONSTANT VARCHAR2(80) := 'KB_VPD_ADMIN_ROLE';
+  c_token_description   CONSTANT VARCHAR2(200) := 'KB VPD admin bootstrap token';
+
+  v_admin_role_id       NUMBER;
+  v_identity_role_id    NUMBER;
+  v_app_user_id         NUMBER;
+  v_permission_id       NUMBER;
+  v_bearer_token        VARCHAR2(128);
+  v_count               NUMBER;
+
+  PROCEDURE ensure_role(
+    p_role_name IN VARCHAR2,
+    p_level     IN VARCHAR2,
+    p_role_id   OUT NUMBER
+  ) IS
+  BEGIN
+    SELECT role_id
+    INTO   p_role_id
+    FROM   cb_app_role
+    WHERE  role_name = p_role_name;
+  EXCEPTION
+    WHEN NO_DATA_FOUND THEN
+      SELECT NVL(MAX(role_id), 0) + 1
+      INTO   p_role_id
+      FROM   cb_app_role;
+      INSERT INTO cb_app_role(role_id, role_name, max_sensitivity_level)
+      VALUES (p_role_id, p_role_name, p_level);
+  END;
+
+  PROCEDURE ensure_user_role(p_user_id IN NUMBER, p_role_id IN NUMBER) IS
+  BEGIN
+    SELECT COUNT(*)
+    INTO   v_count
+    FROM   cb_user_role
+    WHERE  user_id = p_user_id
+    AND    role_id = p_role_id;
+
+    IF v_count = 0 THEN
+      INSERT INTO cb_user_role(user_id, role_id) VALUES (p_user_id, p_role_id);
+    END IF;
+  END;
+
+  PROCEDURE ensure_all_permission(p_target_name IN VARCHAR2) IS
+  BEGIN
+    SELECT MIN(perm_id)
+    INTO   v_permission_id
+    FROM   cb_permission
+    WHERE  role_id = v_admin_role_id
+    AND    target_name = p_target_name
+    AND    action_name = 'SELECT';
+
+    IF v_permission_id IS NULL THEN
+      SELECT cb_permission_seq.NEXTVAL INTO v_permission_id FROM dual;
+      INSERT INTO cb_permission(
+        perm_id, role_id, target_name, action_name, permission_effect
+      ) VALUES (
+        v_permission_id, v_admin_role_id, p_target_name, 'SELECT', 'ALLOW'
+      );
+    ELSE
+      UPDATE cb_permission
+      SET permission_effect = 'ALLOW'
+      WHERE perm_id = v_permission_id;
+    END IF;
+
+    DELETE FROM cb_permission_rule WHERE perm_id = v_permission_id;
+    INSERT INTO cb_permission_rule(rule_id, perm_id, rule_column, rule_type, rule_value)
+    VALUES (cb_permission_rule_seq.NEXTVAL, v_permission_id, NULL, 'ALL', NULL);
+
+    -- CB_ORDS is the non-exempt data runtime.  VPD still applies after
+    -- this object privilege is granted.
+    EXECUTE IMMEDIATE
+      'GRANT SELECT ON POC_2.' || DBMS_ASSERT.SIMPLE_SQL_NAME(p_target_name) || ' TO CB_ORDS';
+  END;
+
+  PROCEDURE allow_original_column(
+    p_target_name IN VARCHAR2,
+    p_column_name IN VARCHAR2
+  ) IS
+  BEGIN
+    SELECT MIN(perm_id)
+    INTO   v_permission_id
+    FROM   cb_permission
+    WHERE  role_id = v_admin_role_id
+    AND    target_name = p_target_name
+    AND    action_name = 'SELECT';
+
+    SELECT COUNT(*)
+    INTO   v_count
+    FROM   cb_permission_column
+    WHERE  permission_id = v_permission_id
+    AND    column_name = p_column_name;
+
+    IF v_count = 0 THEN
+      INSERT INTO cb_permission_column(permission_id, column_name)
+      VALUES (v_permission_id, p_column_name);
+    END IF;
+  END;
+BEGIN
+  MERGE INTO poc_2.kb_stakeholders target
+  USING (
+    SELECT c_stakeholder_user_id AS user_id,
+           'VPD 관리자' AS user_nm,
+           '관리자' AS role,
+           '관리자채널' AS channel,
+           '전체 KB 원장 및 민감 컬럼 접근' AS access_scope,
+           '권한 테이블의 KB_VPD_ADMIN_ROLE / ALL 규칙으로 적용' AS rls_filter
+    FROM dual
+  ) source
+  ON (target.user_id = source.user_id)
+  WHEN MATCHED THEN UPDATE SET
+    target.user_nm = source.user_nm,
+    target.role = source.role,
+    target.channel = source.channel,
+    target.access_scope = source.access_scope,
+    target.rls_filter = source.rls_filter
+  WHEN NOT MATCHED THEN INSERT (
+    user_id, user_nm, role, channel, access_scope, rls_filter
+  ) VALUES (
+    source.user_id, source.user_nm, source.role, source.channel,
+    source.access_scope, source.rls_filter
+  );
+
+  BEGIN
+    SELECT user_id
+    INTO   v_app_user_id
+    FROM   cb_app_user
+    WHERE  stakeholder_user_id = c_stakeholder_user_id;
+  EXCEPTION
+    WHEN NO_DATA_FOUND THEN
+      SELECT NVL(MAX(user_id), 0) + 1 INTO v_app_user_id FROM cb_app_user;
+      INSERT INTO cb_app_user(
+        user_id, user_name, employee_no, dept_code,
+        stakeholder_user_id, can_read_contents, active
+      ) VALUES (
+        v_app_user_id, 'VPD 관리자', c_stakeholder_user_id, '관리자채널',
+        c_stakeholder_user_id, 'Y', 'Y'
+      );
+  END;
+
+  UPDATE cb_app_user
+  SET user_name = 'VPD 관리자',
+      employee_no = c_stakeholder_user_id,
+      dept_code = '관리자채널',
+      can_read_contents = 'Y',
+      active = 'Y'
+  WHERE user_id = v_app_user_id;
+
+  ensure_role(c_role_name, 'RESTRICTED', v_admin_role_id);
+  ensure_role('KB_STAKEHOLDER_IDENTITY_ROLE', 'INTERNAL', v_identity_role_id);
+  ensure_user_role(v_app_user_id, v_admin_role_id);
+  ensure_user_role(v_app_user_id, v_identity_role_id);
+
+  FOR object_name IN (
+    SELECT column_value
+    FROM TABLE(sys.odcivarchar2list(
+      'KB_CUSTOMERS', 'KB_PRODUCTS', 'KB_CONTRACTS', 'KB_COVERAGES',
+      'KB_CLAIMS', 'KB_EXTERNAL_HOLDINGS', 'KB_STAKEHOLDERS'
+    ))
+  ) LOOP
+    ensure_all_permission(object_name.column_value);
+  END LOOP;
+
+  allow_original_column('KB_CUSTOMERS', 'CUST_NM');
+  allow_original_column('KB_CUSTOMERS', 'RRN_MASKED');
+  allow_original_column('KB_CLAIMS', 'CLAIM_AMT');
+  allow_original_column('KB_CLAIMS', 'PAID_AMT');
+  allow_original_column('KB_EXTERNAL_HOLDINGS', 'EXT_INSURER');
+  allow_original_column('KB_EXTERNAL_HOLDINGS', 'EXT_PRODUCT_GRP');
+  allow_original_column('KB_EXTERNAL_HOLDINGS', 'EXT_PRODUCT_TYPE');
+
+  -- Re-running this script rotates only the bootstrap administrator token.
+  UPDATE cb_agent_bearer_key
+  SET active = 'N',
+      revoked_at = SYSDATE
+  WHERE stakeholder_user_id = c_stakeholder_user_id
+    AND description = c_token_description
+    AND active = 'Y';
+
+  v_bearer_token := 'kbvpdadm_' || DBMS_RANDOM.STRING('x', 48);
+  INSERT INTO cb_agent_bearer_key(
+    key_id, user_id, stakeholder_user_id, key_prefix, key_hash,
+    issued_at, expires_at, revoked_at, active, description
+  ) VALUES (
+    cb_agent_bearer_key_seq.NEXTVAL, v_app_user_id, c_stakeholder_user_id,
+    'kbvpdadm', STANDARD_HASH(v_bearer_token, 'SHA256'),
+    SYSDATE, ADD_MONTHS(SYSDATE, 12), NULL, 'Y', c_token_description
+  );
+
+  COMMIT;
+
+  -- This is the application step that binds the Bearer Token to the trusted
+  -- context. DBMS_RLS then invokes CB_AGENT_DOC_VPD_FILTER automatically.
+  cb_agent_ctx_pkg.set_user_by_bearer(v_bearer_token);
+  DBMS_OUTPUT.PUT_LINE('STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID='
+    || SYS_CONTEXT('CB_AGENT_CTX', 'STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID'));
+  DBMS_OUTPUT.PUT_LINE('EFFECTIVE_ROLE=' || c_role_name);
+  DBMS_OUTPUT.PUT_LINE('KB_CUSTOMERS_PREDICATE='
+    || cb_agent_doc_vpd_filter('POC_2', 'KB_CUSTOMERS'));
+  DBMS_OUTPUT.PUT_LINE('KB_CLAIMS_PREDICATE='
+    || cb_agent_doc_vpd_filter('POC_2', 'KB_CLAIMS'));
+  DBMS_OUTPUT.PUT_LINE('KB_EXTERNAL_HOLDINGS_PREDICATE='
+    || cb_agent_doc_vpd_filter('POC_2', 'KB_EXTERNAL_HOLDINGS'));
+  cb_agent_ctx_pkg.clear_user;
+
+  -- Show once. The raw token is never stored; only its SHA-256 hash remains.
+  DBMS_OUTPUT.PUT_LINE('BEARER_TOKEN=' || v_bearer_token);
+END;
+/
+
+PROMPT === KB VPD administrator token ready ===

sql/adb/52_cleanup_to_kb_vpd_poc.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+-- ============================================================
+-- 52_cleanup_to_kb_vpd_poc.sql
+--
+-- Removes legacy document/Vector/DDS/test examples and keeps only
+-- the KB structured-data VPD POC:
+--   POC_2.KB_* seven ledgers, stakeholder identity, KB roles,
+--   bearer-token permission metadata, and their VPD policies.
+--
+-- Oracle-maintained ANNOTATIONS_* / VECTOR$* auxiliary objects are
+-- not dropped directly.  Their owning RAG/vector tables are dropped.
+-- ============================================================
+WHENEVER SQLERROR EXIT SQL.SQLCODE
+SET ECHO OFF
+SET FEEDBACK ON
+SET DEFINE OFF
+SET SERVEROUTPUT ON
+ALTER SESSION DISABLE PARALLEL DML;
+
+PROMPT === 1. Removing document, legacy role, and test permissions ===
+DECLARE
+  c_role_keep_1 CONSTANT VARCHAR2(80) := 'KB_DESIGNER_ROLE';
+  c_role_keep_2 CONSTANT VARCHAR2(80) := 'KB_BRANCH_MANAGER_ROLE';
+  c_role_keep_3 CONSTANT VARCHAR2(80) := 'KB_STAKEHOLDER_IDENTITY_ROLE';
+  c_role_keep_4 CONSTANT VARCHAR2(80) := 'KB_VPD_ADMIN_ROLE';
+BEGIN
+  DELETE FROM cb_permission_column
+  WHERE permission_id IN (
+    SELECT p.perm_id
+    FROM cb_permission p
+    JOIN cb_app_role r ON r.role_id = p.role_id
+    WHERE r.role_name NOT IN (c_role_keep_1, c_role_keep_2, c_role_keep_3, c_role_keep_4)
+       OR p.target_name NOT IN (
+         'KB_CUSTOMERS', 'KB_PRODUCTS', 'KB_CONTRACTS', 'KB_COVERAGES',
+         'KB_CLAIMS', 'KB_EXTERNAL_HOLDINGS', 'KB_STAKEHOLDERS'
+       )
+  );
+
+  DELETE FROM cb_permission_rule
+  WHERE perm_id IN (
+    SELECT p.perm_id
+    FROM cb_permission p
+    JOIN cb_app_role r ON r.role_id = p.role_id
+    WHERE r.role_name NOT IN (c_role_keep_1, c_role_keep_2, c_role_keep_3, c_role_keep_4)
+       OR p.target_name NOT IN (
+         'KB_CUSTOMERS', 'KB_PRODUCTS', 'KB_CONTRACTS', 'KB_COVERAGES',
+         'KB_CLAIMS', 'KB_EXTERNAL_HOLDINGS', 'KB_STAKEHOLDERS'
+       )
+  );
+
+  DELETE FROM cb_permission
+  WHERE perm_id IN (
+    SELECT p.perm_id
+    FROM cb_permission p
+    JOIN cb_app_role r ON r.role_id = p.role_id
+    WHERE r.role_name NOT IN (c_role_keep_1, c_role_keep_2, c_role_keep_3, c_role_keep_4)
+       OR p.target_name NOT IN (
+         'KB_CUSTOMERS', 'KB_PRODUCTS', 'KB_CONTRACTS', 'KB_COVERAGES',
+         'KB_CLAIMS', 'KB_EXTERNAL_HOLDINGS', 'KB_STAKEHOLDERS'
+       )
+  );
+
+  DELETE FROM cb_user_role
+  WHERE role_id IN (
+    SELECT role_id
+    FROM cb_app_role
+    WHERE role_name NOT IN (c_role_keep_1, c_role_keep_2, c_role_keep_3, c_role_keep_4)
+  );
+
+  DELETE FROM cb_group_role;
+  DELETE FROM cb_user_group;
+  DELETE FROM cb_app_group;
+
+  DELETE FROM cb_app_role
+  WHERE role_name NOT IN (c_role_keep_1, c_role_keep_2, c_role_keep_3, c_role_keep_4);
+
+  -- Keep only tokens attached to an actual KB stakeholder.
+  DELETE FROM cb_agent_bearer_key
+  WHERE stakeholder_user_id IS NULL;
+
+  -- Non-stakeholder users were document/test sample principals.
+  DELETE FROM cb_app_user
+  WHERE stakeholder_user_id IS NULL;
+
+  DELETE FROM cb_vpd_filter_note;
+  DELETE FROM cb_vpd_policy_note;
+  DELETE FROM cb_ords_probe_audit;
+
+  DELETE FROM cb_protected_column
+  WHERE object_id IN (
+    SELECT object_id
+    FROM cb_protected_object
+    WHERE NOT (
+      owner = 'POC_2'
+      AND object_name IN (
+        'KB_CUSTOMERS', 'KB_PRODUCTS', 'KB_CONTRACTS', 'KB_COVERAGES',
+        'KB_CLAIMS', 'KB_EXTERNAL_HOLDINGS', 'KB_STAKEHOLDERS'
+      )
+    )
+  );
+
+  DELETE FROM cb_protected_object
+  WHERE NOT (
+    owner = 'POC_2'
+    AND object_name IN (
+      'KB_CUSTOMERS', 'KB_PRODUCTS', 'KB_CONTRACTS', 'KB_COVERAGES',
+      'KB_CLAIMS', 'KB_EXTERNAL_HOLDINGS', 'KB_STAKEHOLDERS'
+    )
+  );
+
+  COMMIT;
+END;
+/
+
+PROMPT === 2. Removing legacy document VPD/redaction and source objects ===
+BEGIN
+  DBMS_REDACT.DROP_POLICY(
+    object_schema => 'ADMIN',
+    object_name   => 'CB_V_SEARCH_DOCUMENTS',
+    policy_name   => 'CB_CONTENTS_REDACT'
+  );
+EXCEPTION
+  WHEN OTHERS THEN
+    -- The policy may already be absent in a reduced POC schema.
+    DBMS_OUTPUT.PUT_LINE('redaction policy not removed: ' || SQLERRM);
+END;
+/
+
+DECLARE
+  v_count NUMBER;
+BEGIN
+  SELECT COUNT(*)
+  INTO   v_count
+  FROM   all_policies
+  WHERE  object_owner = 'ADMIN'
+  AND    object_name = 'CB_V_SEARCH_DOCUMENTS'
+  AND    policy_name = 'CB_AGENT_DOC_POLICY';
+
+  IF v_count > 0 THEN
+    DBMS_RLS.DROP_POLICY(
+      object_schema => 'ADMIN',
+      object_name   => 'CB_V_SEARCH_DOCUMENTS',
+      policy_name   => 'CB_AGENT_DOC_POLICY'
+    );
+  END IF;
+END;
+/
+
+BEGIN
+  EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'DROP VIEW cb_v_search_documents';
+EXCEPTION
+  WHEN OTHERS THEN
+    IF SQLCODE != -942 THEN
+      RAISE;
+    END IF;
+END;
+/
+
+BEGIN
+  EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'DROP TABLE cb_search_documents PURGE';
+EXCEPTION
+  WHEN OTHERS THEN
+    IF SQLCODE != -942 THEN
+      RAISE;
+    END IF;
+END;
+/
+
+PROMPT === 3. Dropping unrelated POC_2 backup, RAG, and security-example tables ===
+DECLARE
+  PROCEDURE drop_table_if_exists(p_table_name IN VARCHAR2) IS
+  BEGIN
+    EXECUTE IMMEDIATE
+      'DROP TABLE POC_2.' || DBMS_ASSERT.SIMPLE_SQL_NAME(p_table_name)
+      || ' CASCADE CONSTRAINTS PURGE';
+    DBMS_OUTPUT.PUT_LINE('dropped POC_2.' || p_table_name);
+  EXCEPTION
+    WHEN OTHERS THEN
+      IF SQLCODE = -942 THEN
+        NULL;
+      ELSE
+        RAISE;
+      END IF;
+  END;
+BEGIN
+  drop_table_if_exists('BKP_CLM_20260701144052');
+  drop_table_if_exists('BKP_CONT_20260701144052');
+  drop_table_if_exists('BKP_COV_20260701144052');
+  drop_table_if_exists('BKP_CUST_20260701144052');
+  drop_table_if_exists('BKP_EXT_20260701144052');
+  drop_table_if_exists('BKP_PROD_20260701144052');
+  drop_table_if_exists('KB_CUST_BAK_202607011343');
+  drop_table_if_exists('KB_CUST_BAK_20260701134439');
+  drop_table_if_exists('KB_AIDP_RAG_CORPUS_CONFIG');
+  drop_table_if_exists('KB_AIDP_RAG_QUERY_CACHE');
+  drop_table_if_exists('KB_COMPETITOR_TERMS_CHUNKS');
+  drop_table_if_exists('KB_COMPETITOR_TERMS_DOCUMENTS');
+  drop_table_if_exists('KB_OWN_TERMS_CHUNKS');
+  drop_table_if_exists('KB_OWN_TERMS_DOCUMENTS');
+  drop_table_if_exists('KB_SECURITY_AUDIT_LOG');
+  drop_table_if_exists('KB_SECURITY_POLICY_CATALOG');
+END;
+/
+
+PROMPT === 4. Remaining KB VPD POC inventory ===
+SELECT object_name
+FROM cb_protected_object
+WHERE owner = 'POC_2'
+ORDER BY object_name;
+
+SELECT role_name
+FROM cb_app_role
+ORDER BY role_name;
+
+SELECT key_id, stakeholder_user_id, key_prefix, active, expires_at
+FROM cb_agent_bearer_key
+ORDER BY key_id;
+
+SELECT object_owner, object_name, policy_name, function, enable
+FROM all_policies
+WHERE object_owner = 'POC_2'
+ORDER BY object_name, policy_name;
+
+PROMPT === KB VPD POC cleanup complete ===

sql/adb/53_drop_legacy_poc_objects.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+-- ============================================================
+-- 53_drop_legacy_poc_objects.sql
+-- Completes the physical-object portion of the KB VPD POC cleanup
+-- after 52 has removed legacy permissions, roles, tokens and users.
+-- ============================================================
+WHENEVER SQLERROR EXIT SQL.SQLCODE
+SET ECHO OFF
+SET FEEDBACK ON
+SET DEFINE OFF
+SET SERVEROUTPUT ON
+
+PROMPT === Removing legacy document VPD/redaction and source objects ===
+BEGIN
+  DBMS_REDACT.DROP_POLICY(
+    object_schema => 'ADMIN',
+    object_name   => 'CB_V_SEARCH_DOCUMENTS',
+    policy_name   => 'CB_CONTENTS_REDACT'
+  );
+EXCEPTION
+  WHEN OTHERS THEN
+    DBMS_OUTPUT.PUT_LINE('redaction policy not removed: ' || SQLERRM);
+END;
+/
+
+DECLARE
+  v_count NUMBER;
+BEGIN
+  SELECT COUNT(*)
+  INTO   v_count
+  FROM   all_policies
+  WHERE  object_owner = 'ADMIN'
+  AND    object_name = 'CB_V_SEARCH_DOCUMENTS'
+  AND    policy_name = 'CB_AGENT_DOC_POLICY';
+
+  IF v_count > 0 THEN
+    DBMS_RLS.DROP_POLICY(
+      object_schema => 'ADMIN',
+      object_name   => 'CB_V_SEARCH_DOCUMENTS',
+      policy_name   => 'CB_AGENT_DOC_POLICY'
+    );
+  END IF;
+END;
+/
+
+BEGIN
+  EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'DROP VIEW cb_v_search_documents';
+EXCEPTION
+  WHEN OTHERS THEN
+    IF SQLCODE != -942 THEN
+      RAISE;
+    END IF;
+END;
+/
+
+BEGIN
+  EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'DROP TABLE cb_search_documents PURGE';
+EXCEPTION
+  WHEN OTHERS THEN
+    IF SQLCODE != -942 THEN
+      RAISE;
+    END IF;
+END;
+/
+
+PROMPT === Dropping unrelated POC_2 backup, RAG, and security-example tables ===
+DECLARE
+  PROCEDURE drop_table_if_exists(p_table_name IN VARCHAR2) IS
+  BEGIN
+    EXECUTE IMMEDIATE
+      'DROP TABLE POC_2.' || DBMS_ASSERT.SIMPLE_SQL_NAME(p_table_name)
+      || ' CASCADE CONSTRAINTS PURGE';
+    DBMS_OUTPUT.PUT_LINE('dropped POC_2.' || p_table_name);
+  EXCEPTION
+    WHEN OTHERS THEN
+      IF SQLCODE = -942 THEN
+        NULL;
+      ELSE
+        RAISE;
+      END IF;
+  END;
+BEGIN
+  drop_table_if_exists('BKP_CLM_20260701144052');
+  drop_table_if_exists('BKP_CONT_20260701144052');
+  drop_table_if_exists('BKP_COV_20260701144052');
+  drop_table_if_exists('BKP_CUST_20260701144052');
+  drop_table_if_exists('BKP_EXT_20260701144052');
+  drop_table_if_exists('BKP_PROD_20260701144052');
+  drop_table_if_exists('KB_CUST_BAK_202607011343');
+  drop_table_if_exists('KB_CUST_BAK_20260701134439');
+  drop_table_if_exists('KB_AIDP_RAG_CORPUS_CONFIG');
+  drop_table_if_exists('KB_AIDP_RAG_QUERY_CACHE');
+  drop_table_if_exists('KB_COMPETITOR_TERMS_CHUNKS');
+  drop_table_if_exists('KB_COMPETITOR_TERMS_DOCUMENTS');
+  drop_table_if_exists('KB_OWN_TERMS_CHUNKS');
+  drop_table_if_exists('KB_OWN_TERMS_DOCUMENTS');
+  drop_table_if_exists('KB_SECURITY_AUDIT_LOG');
+  drop_table_if_exists('KB_SECURITY_POLICY_CATALOG');
+END;
+/
+
+PROMPT === Legacy physical objects removed ===

sql/adb/54_drop_legacy_dds_ords_examples.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+-- ============================================================
+-- 54_drop_legacy_dds_ords_examples.sql
+-- Removes only the former document-search ORDS/DDS example objects.
+-- It deliberately keeps CB_ORDS because it is the non-exempt KB VPD
+-- runtime principal.
+-- ============================================================
+WHENEVER SQLERROR EXIT SQL.SQLCODE
+SET ECHO OFF
+SET FEEDBACK ON
+SET DEFINE OFF
+SET SERVEROUTPUT ON
+
+BEGIN
+  ORDS.DELETE_MODULE(p_module_name => 'cb.agent.security');
+  DBMS_OUTPUT.PUT_LINE('dropped ORDS module cb.agent.security');
+EXCEPTION
+  WHEN OTHERS THEN
+    DBMS_OUTPUT.PUT_LINE('ORDS module not removed: ' || SQLERRM);
+END;
+/
+
+DECLARE
+  PROCEDURE drop_ddl_if_present(p_ddl IN VARCHAR2) IS
+  BEGIN
+    EXECUTE IMMEDIATE p_ddl;
+    DBMS_OUTPUT.PUT_LINE('dropped: ' || p_ddl);
+  EXCEPTION
+    WHEN OTHERS THEN
+      DBMS_OUTPUT.PUT_LINE('not present: ' || p_ddl);
+  END;
+BEGIN
+  drop_ddl_if_present('DROP DATA GRANT admin.cb_dg_hr_docs');
+  drop_ddl_if_present('DROP DATA GRANT admin.cb_dg_fin_docs');
+  drop_ddl_if_present('DROP DATA GRANT admin.cb_dg_all_docs');
+  drop_ddl_if_present('DROP END USER "cb_dds_hr"');
+  drop_ddl_if_present('DROP END USER "cb_dds_fin"');
+  drop_ddl_if_present('DROP END USER "cb_dds_all"');
+  drop_ddl_if_present('DROP END USER "cb_dds_none"');
+  drop_ddl_if_present('DROP DATA ROLE cb_dds_hr_role');
+  drop_ddl_if_present('DROP DATA ROLE cb_dds_fin_role');
+  drop_ddl_if_present('DROP DATA ROLE cb_dds_all_role');
+  drop_ddl_if_present('DROP DATA ROLE cb_dds_connect_only_role');
+  drop_ddl_if_present('DROP ROLE cb_dds_connect_role');
+END;
+/
+
+PROMPT === Legacy DDS/ORDS examples removed ===

src/main/java/com/cloudhandson/vpdbackoffice/service/PermissionService.java

@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ import java.util.HashSet;
 import java.util.List;
 import java.util.Locale;
 import java.util.Set;
+import java.util.regex.Matcher;
+import java.util.regex.Pattern;
 import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
 import org.springframework.stereotype.Service;
 import org.springframework.transaction.annotation.Transactional;
@@ -22,11 +24,21 @@ public class PermissionService {
 
   private static final Set<String> RULE_TYPES = Set.of(
       "ALL", "=", "!=", "MY_DEPT", "SELF", "DEPT", "EMP_NO", "TAG",
-      "STAKEHOLDER_SELF", "STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL");
+      "STAKEHOLDER_SELF", "STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL",
+      "TOKEN_SUBJECT", "OWN_CONTRACT", "CHANNEL_CONTRACT", "OWN_CUSTOMER", "CHANNEL_CUSTOMER",
+      "STATIC_SQL");
   private static final Set<String> VALUE_REQUIRED_RULE_TYPES = Set.of(
-      "=", "!=", "DEPT", "EMP_NO", "TAG", "STAKEHOLDER_SELF", "STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL");
+      "=", "!=", "DEPT", "EMP_NO", "TAG", "STAKEHOLDER_SELF", "STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL", "STATIC_SQL");
   private static final Set<String> DEFAULT_COLUMN_RULE_TYPES = Set.of(
-      "MY_DEPT", "SELF", "DEPT", "EMP_NO", "TAG");
+      "MY_DEPT", "SELF", "DEPT", "EMP_NO", "TAG", "STATIC_SQL");
+  private static final Set<String> STATIC_SQL_KEYWORDS = Set.of(
+      "AND", "OR", "NOT", "NULL", "IS", "IN", "LIKE", "BETWEEN", "ESCAPE", "TRUE", "FALSE",
+      "UPPER", "LOWER", "TRIM", "NVL", "COALESCE", "TO_CHAR", "TO_DATE", "REGEXP_LIKE", "INSTR",
+      "LENGTH", "SUBSTR", "REPLACE", "CAST", "AS", "DATE", "TIMESTAMP", "NUMBER", "VARCHAR2", "CHAR");
+  private static final Pattern SQL_STRING_LITERAL = Pattern.compile("'(?:''|[^'])*'");
+  private static final Pattern SQL_IDENTIFIER = Pattern.compile("[A-Z_$#][A-Z0-9_$#]*");
+  private static final Pattern SQL_QUALIFIED_IDENTIFIER =
+      Pattern.compile("[A-Z_$#][A-Z0-9_$#]*\\s*\\.", Pattern.CASE_INSENSITIVE);
   private static final Set<String> PERMISSION_EFFECTS = Set.of("ALLOW", "DENY");
   private static final Set<String> SENSITIVITY_LEVELS = Set.of(
       "PUBLIC", "INTERNAL", "CONFIDENTIAL", "RESTRICTED");
@@ -225,12 +237,18 @@ public class PermissionService {
       if ("TAG".equals(type) && column == null && !allowedColumns.contains("TECH_TAG")) {
         throw new AppException("TAG 규칙의 기본 컬럼 TECH_TAG가 보호 객체에 없습니다. 컬럼을 지정하세요.");
       }
+      if ("STATIC_SQL".equals(type) && column != null) {
+        throw new AppException("정적 SQL 조건은 컬럼 선택 없이 조건식 전체를 입력하세요.");
+      }
       if (VALUE_REQUIRED_RULE_TYPES.contains(type) && ruleValue.isBlank()) {
         throw new AppException(type + " 규칙에는 값이 필요합니다.");
       }
       if ("TAG".equals(type) && !ruleValue.matches("[A-Z0-9_-]+")) {
         throw new AppException("TAG 값은 영문 대문자, 숫자, '_' 또는 '-'만 사용할 수 있습니다.");
       }
+      if ("STATIC_SQL".equals(type)) {
+        validateStaticSqlPredicate(ruleValue, allowedColumns);
+      }
     }
     if (hasAll && rules.size() > 1) {
       throw new AppException("ALL 규칙은 다른 규칙과 함께 저장할 수 없습니다.");
@@ -245,6 +263,41 @@ public class PermissionService {
     return allowed;
   }
 
+  private void validateStaticSqlPredicate(String predicate, Set<String> allowedColumns) {
+    if (predicate.length() > 1000) {
+      throw new AppException("정적 SQL 조건은 1,000자 이하여야 합니다.");
+    }
+    if (predicate.chars().filter(value -> value == '\'').count() % 2 != 0) {
+      throw new AppException("정적 SQL 조건의 문자열 따옴표가 닫히지 않았습니다.");
+    }
+    if (predicate.indexOf(';') >= 0 || predicate.contains("--") || predicate.contains("/*")
+        || predicate.contains("*/") || predicate.indexOf(':') >= 0 || predicate.indexOf('@') >= 0
+        || predicate.contains("||") || predicate.chars().anyMatch(Character::isISOControl)) {
+      throw new AppException("정적 SQL 조건에는 단일 WHERE 조건식만 입력할 수 있습니다.");
+    }
+
+    String lexical = SQL_STRING_LITERAL.matcher(predicate).replaceAll(" ");
+    if (SQL_QUALIFIED_IDENTIFIER.matcher(lexical).find()) {
+      throw new AppException("정적 SQL 조건에는 다른 테이블·스키마를 참조할 수 없습니다.");
+    }
+
+    boolean hasObjectColumn = false;
+    Matcher matcher = SQL_IDENTIFIER.matcher(lexical.toUpperCase(Locale.ROOT));
+    while (matcher.find()) {
+      String token = matcher.group();
+      if (STATIC_SQL_KEYWORDS.contains(token)) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (!allowedColumns.contains(token)) {
+        throw new AppException("정적 SQL 조건에는 보호 객체 컬럼과 허용된 SQL 연산자만 사용할 수 있습니다: " + token);
+      }
+      hasObjectColumn = true;
+    }
+    if (!hasObjectColumn) {
+      throw new AppException("정적 SQL 조건에는 보호 객체 컬럼이 하나 이상 필요합니다.");
+    }
+  }
+
   private void validateVisibleColumns(long objectId, List<String> visibleColumns) {
     if (visibleColumns == null || visibleColumns.isEmpty()) {
       return;

src/main/resources/mapper/PermissionMapper.xml

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
     SELECT p.perm_id AS permission_id,
            r.role_id,
            r.role_name,
-           o.object_id,
+           NVL(o.object_id, -1) AS object_id,
            p.target_name AS object_name,
            p.action_name AS action,
            NVL(p.permission_effect, 'ALLOW') AS permission_effect,
@@ -93,27 +93,24 @@
                         WHEN pr2.rule_type = 'TAG' THEN 'REGEXP_LIKE(UPPER('
                           || NVL(pr2.rule_column, 'TECH_TAG')
                           || '), ''(^|,)' || REPLACE(UPPER(pr2.rule_value), '''', '''''') || '(,|$)'')'
-                        WHEN pr2.rule_type = 'STAKEHOLDER_SELF' AND pr2.rule_column = 'FC_ID' THEN
+                        WHEN pr2.rule_type = 'TOKEN_SUBJECT' THEN
-                          '(SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_ROLE'') = ''' || NVL(pr2.rule_value, '[역할값 필요]') || ''' '
+                          pr2.rule_column || ' = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID'')'
-                          || 'AND FC_ID = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID''))'
+                        WHEN pr2.rule_type = 'OWN_CONTRACT' THEN
-                        WHEN pr2.rule_type = 'STAKEHOLDER_SELF' AND pr2.rule_column = 'USER_ID' THEN
+                          pr2.rule_column || ' = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID'')'
-                          '(USER_ID = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID''))'
+                        WHEN pr2.rule_type = 'CHANNEL_CONTRACT' THEN
-                        WHEN pr2.rule_type = 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL' AND pr2.rule_column = 'FC_CHANNEL' THEN
+                          pr2.rule_column || ' = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL'')'
-                          '(SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_ROLE'') = ''' || NVL(pr2.rule_value, '[역할값 필요]') || ''' '
+                        WHEN pr2.rule_type = 'OWN_CUSTOMER' THEN
-                          || 'AND FC_CHANNEL = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL''))'
-                        WHEN pr2.rule_type = 'STAKEHOLDER_SELF' THEN
                           'EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM POC_2.KB_CONTRACTS c '
                           || 'WHERE c.' || pr2.rule_column || ' = [CURRENT_ROW].' || pr2.rule_column || ' '
-                          || 'AND SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_ROLE'') = ''' || NVL(pr2.rule_value, '[역할값 필요]') || ''' '
                           || 'AND c.FC_ID = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID''))'
-                        WHEN pr2.rule_type = 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL' THEN
+                        WHEN pr2.rule_type = 'CHANNEL_CUSTOMER' THEN
                           'EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM POC_2.KB_CONTRACTS c '
                           || 'WHERE c.' || pr2.rule_column || ' = [CURRENT_ROW].' || pr2.rule_column || ' '
-                          || 'AND SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_ROLE'') = ''' || NVL(pr2.rule_value, '[역할값 필요]') || ''' '
                           || 'AND c.FC_CHANNEL = SYS_CONTEXT(''CB_AGENT_CTX'', ''STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL''))'
+                        WHEN pr2.rule_type = 'STATIC_SQL' THEN pr2.rule_value
                         ELSE pr2.rule_column || ' ' || pr2.rule_type || ' ' || pr2.rule_value
                       END,
-                      CHR(10) || 'OR '
+                      CHR(10) || 'AND '
                     ) WITHIN GROUP (ORDER BY pr2.rule_id)
              FROM cb_permission_rule pr2
              WHERE pr2.perm_id = p.perm_id

src/main/resources/static/js/app.js

@@ -388,8 +388,8 @@ function syncRuleTypeHints(root = document) {
     }
 
     const type = typeSelect.value;
-    const valueRequired = ['=', '!=', 'DEPT', 'EMP_NO', 'TAG', 'STAKEHOLDER_SELF', 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL'].includes(type);
+    const valueRequired = ['=', '!=', 'DEPT', 'EMP_NO', 'TAG', 'STAKEHOLDER_SELF', 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL', 'STATIC_SQL'].includes(type);
-    const columnOptional = ['ALL', 'MY_DEPT', 'SELF', 'DEPT', 'EMP_NO', 'TAG'].includes(type);
+    const columnOptional = ['ALL', 'MY_DEPT', 'SELF', 'DEPT', 'EMP_NO', 'TAG', 'STATIC_SQL'].includes(type);
     const placeholderByType = {
       ALL: '값 불필요',
       MY_DEPT: '값 불필요',
@@ -399,17 +399,30 @@ function syncRuleTypeHints(root = document) {
       TAG: '예: SPRING_BOOT',
       STAKEHOLDER_SELF: '예: 설계사',
       STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL: '예: 지점장',
+      TOKEN_SUBJECT: '값 불필요',
+      OWN_CONTRACT: '값 불필요',
+      CHANNEL_CONTRACT: '값 불필요',
+      OWN_CUSTOMER: '값 불필요',
+      CHANNEL_CUSTOMER: '값 불필요',
+      STATIC_SQL: "예: CONTRACT_STATUS = '정상'",
       '=': '비교 값',
       '!=': '비교 값'
     };
 
     columnSelect.required = !columnOptional;
+    columnSelect.disabled = ['ALL', 'MY_DEPT', 'SELF', 'DEPT', 'EMP_NO', 'TAG', 'STATIC_SQL'].includes(type);
     valueInput.required = valueRequired;
-    valueInput.disabled = ['ALL', 'MY_DEPT', 'SELF'].includes(type);
+    valueInput.disabled = [
+      'ALL', 'MY_DEPT', 'SELF', 'TOKEN_SUBJECT', 'OWN_CONTRACT',
+      'CHANNEL_CONTRACT', 'OWN_CUSTOMER', 'CHANNEL_CUSTOMER'
+    ].includes(type);
     valueInput.placeholder = placeholderByType[type] || '비교 값';
     if (valueInput.disabled) {
       valueInput.value = '';
     }
+    if (columnSelect.disabled) {
+      columnSelect.value = '';
+    }
   });
 }
 
@@ -700,17 +713,29 @@ function collectWizardRules(root) {
       TAG: 'TECH_TAG',
       STAKEHOLDER_SELF: '선택 컬럼',
       STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL: '선택 컬럼',
+      TOKEN_SUBJECT: '선택 컬럼',
+      OWN_CONTRACT: '선택 컬럼',
+      CHANNEL_CONTRACT: '선택 컬럼',
+      OWN_CUSTOMER: '선택 컬럼',
+      CHANNEL_CUSTOMER: '선택 컬럼',
+      STATIC_SQL: '',
       ALL: ''
     }[type] || '';
     if (type === 'ALL') {
       return 'ALL';
     }
+    if (type === 'STATIC_SQL') {
+      return `정적 SQL: ${value}`;
+    }
     if (['MY_DEPT', 'SELF'].includes(type)) {
       return `${displayColumn} ${type}`;
     }
     if (['STAKEHOLDER_SELF', 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL'].includes(type)) {
       return `${displayColumn} ${type} 역할=${value}`;
     }
+    if (['TOKEN_SUBJECT', 'OWN_CONTRACT', 'CHANNEL_CONTRACT', 'OWN_CUSTOMER', 'CHANNEL_CUSTOMER'].includes(type)) {
+      return `${displayColumn} ${type}`;
+    }
     if (type === 'TAG') {
       return `${displayColumn} TAG ${value.toUpperCase()}`;
     }
@@ -731,11 +756,20 @@ function collectWizardPredicates(root) {
       TAG: 'TECH_TAG',
       STAKEHOLDER_SELF: '선택 컬럼',
       STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL: '선택 컬럼',
+      TOKEN_SUBJECT: '선택 컬럼',
+      OWN_CONTRACT: '선택 컬럼',
+      CHANNEL_CONTRACT: '선택 컬럼',
+      OWN_CUSTOMER: '선택 컬럼',
+      CHANNEL_CUSTOMER: '선택 컬럼',
+      STATIC_SQL: '',
       ALL: ''
     }[type] || '';
     if (type === 'ALL') {
       return '1 = 1';
     }
+    if (type === 'STATIC_SQL') {
+      return value;
+    }
     if (type === 'MY_DEPT') {
       return `${displayColumn} = SYS_CONTEXT('CB_AGENT_CTX', 'DEPT_CODE')`;
     }
@@ -748,6 +782,21 @@ function collectWizardPredicates(root) {
     if (type === 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL') {
       return `EXISTS (KB_CONTRACTS c: c.${displayColumn} = <현재행>.${displayColumn} AND TOKEN_ROLE = '${value}' AND c.FC_CHANNEL = TOKEN_CHANNEL)`;
     }
+    if (type === 'TOKEN_SUBJECT') {
+      return `${displayColumn} = SYS_CONTEXT('CB_AGENT_CTX', 'STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID')`;
+    }
+    if (type === 'OWN_CONTRACT') {
+      return `${displayColumn} = SYS_CONTEXT('CB_AGENT_CTX', 'STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID')`;
+    }
+    if (type === 'CHANNEL_CONTRACT') {
+      return `${displayColumn} = SYS_CONTEXT('CB_AGENT_CTX', 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL')`;
+    }
+    if (type === 'OWN_CUSTOMER') {
+      return `${displayColumn} IN (SELECT CUST_ID FROM KB_CONTRACTS WHERE FC_ID = SYS_CONTEXT('CB_AGENT_CTX', 'STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID'))`;
+    }
+    if (type === 'CHANNEL_CUSTOMER') {
+      return `${displayColumn} IN (SELECT CUST_ID FROM KB_CONTRACTS WHERE FC_CHANNEL = SYS_CONTEXT('CB_AGENT_CTX', 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL'))`;
+    }
     if (type === 'DEPT' || type === 'EMP_NO') {
       return `${displayColumn} = ${sqlLiteral(value)}`;
     }
@@ -794,8 +843,8 @@ function updatePermissionWizardPreview(root = document) {
       ? `거부 규칙: ${ruleText}`
       : `허용 규칙: ${ruleText}`;
   const predicateText = effect === 'DENY'
-      ? (rules.includes('ALL') ? 'DENY ALL: 1 = 0' : `DENY 후보: NOT (${predicates.join(' OR ') || '조건 없음'})`)
+      ? (rules.includes('ALL') ? 'DENY ALL: 1 = 0' : `DENY 후보: NOT (${predicates.join(' AND ') || '조건 없음'})`)
-      : `ALLOW 후보: ${predicates.join(' OR ') || '조건 없음'}`;
+      : `ALLOW 후보: ${predicates.join(' AND ') || '조건 없음'}`;
   const columnPolicy = visibleColumns
       ? `이 권한에서 원문 표시 허용: ${visibleColumns}`
       : '마스킹 대상 컬럼은 기본 정책대로 NULL/마스킹 처리';
@@ -872,19 +921,25 @@ function permissionWizardRuleValidationMessage(wizard) {
   if (values.some((rule) => rule.type === 'ALL') && values.length > 1) {
     return 'ALL 규칙은 다른 조건 규칙과 함께 저장할 수 없습니다. ALL만 남기거나 ALL을 삭제하세요.';
   }
-  const valueRequired = ['=', '!=', 'DEPT', 'EMP_NO', 'TAG', 'STAKEHOLDER_SELF', 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL'];
+  const valueRequired = ['=', '!=', 'DEPT', 'EMP_NO', 'TAG', 'STAKEHOLDER_SELF', 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL', 'STATIC_SQL'];
   const seen = new Set();
   for (const [index, rule] of values.entries()) {
     const position = index + 1;
     if (!rule.type) {
       return `${position}번째 행 규칙 유형을 선택하세요.`;
     }
-    if (['=', '!=', 'STAKEHOLDER_SELF', 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL'].includes(rule.type) && !rule.column) {
+    if ([
+      '=', '!=', 'STAKEHOLDER_SELF', 'STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL', 'TOKEN_SUBJECT',
+      'OWN_CONTRACT', 'CHANNEL_CONTRACT', 'OWN_CUSTOMER', 'CHANNEL_CUSTOMER'
+    ].includes(rule.type) && !rule.column) {
       return `${position}번째 ${rule.type} 규칙에는 비교할 컬럼이 필요합니다.`;
     }
     if (valueRequired.includes(rule.type) && !rule.value) {
       return `${position}번째 ${rule.type} 규칙의 값을 입력하세요.`;
     }
+    if (rule.type === 'STATIC_SQL' && rule.column) {
+      return `${position}번째 정적 SQL 조건은 컬럼을 따로 선택하지 마세요.`;
+    }
     if (rule.type === 'TAG' && rule.value && !/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(rule.value)) {
       return `${position}번째 TAG 값은 영문·숫자, '_' 또는 '-'만 사용할 수 있습니다.`;
     }

src/main/resources/templates/permissions.html

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
     <h1>접근 규칙</h1>
     <details class="explanation-details">
       <summary>도움말</summary>
-      <p>VPD policy function이 참조할 사용자, 역할, 행 규칙, 컬럼 원문 허용 규칙을 저장합니다. KB 원장 예제는 토큰 주체에서 한 번 해석한 이해당사자 ID·역할·채널을 secure context로 사용하고, 대상 고객은 계약원장으로만 연결합니다. <code>STAKEHOLDER_SELF</code>와 <code>STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL</code>은 각각의 역할 분기로 만들고 허용 분기끼리는 OR로 계산합니다.</p>
+      <p>VPD policy function이 참조할 사용자, 역할, 행 규칙, 컬럼 원문 허용 규칙을 저장합니다. KB 조건 코드는 토큰 context 값으로 치환되고, 정적 SQL 조건은 대상 객체의 WHERE 절에 그대로 추가됩니다. 한 권한의 규칙은 AND, 서로 다른 ALLOW 권한은 OR로 합치며 DENY는 허용 결과에서 제외합니다.</p>
     </details>
   </div>
 
@@ -154,31 +154,32 @@
           <div id="rowRuleList" class="rule-list">
             <div class="rule-row">
               <select class="form-select rule-column-select" name="ruleColumn">
-                <option value="">기본 컬럼</option>
+                <option value="">객체 컬럼 선택</option>
-                <option value="DEPT_CODE">DEPT_CODE</option>
-                <option value="OWNER_EMP_NO">OWNER_EMP_NO</option>
-                <option value="DOC_ID">DOC_ID</option>
-                <option value="TITLE">TITLE</option>
               </select>
               <select class="form-select rule-type-select" name="ruleType">
                 <option value="ALL">ALL</option>
-                <option value="MY_DEPT">현재 사용자 부서</option>
+                <optgroup label="KB · 본인 범위">
-                <option value="SELF">현재 사용자 사번</option>
+                  <option value="OWN_CONTRACT">본인 담당 계약</option>
-                <option value="DEPT">지정 부서</option>
+                  <option value="OWN_CUSTOMER">본인 담당 고객</option>
-                <option value="EMP_NO">지정 사번</option>
+                </optgroup>
-                <option value="TAG">특정 기술 태그</option>
+                <optgroup label="KB · 채널 범위">
-                <option value="STAKEHOLDER_SELF">이해당사자 본인 담당</option>
+                  <option value="CHANNEL_CONTRACT">토큰 채널 계약</option>
-                <option value="STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL">이해당사자 채널 범위</option>
+                  <option value="CHANNEL_CUSTOMER">토큰 채널 고객</option>
-                <option value="=">=</option>
+                </optgroup>
-                <option value="!=">!=</option>
+                <optgroup label="KB · 토큰 식별">
+                  <option value="TOKEN_SUBJECT">토큰 사용자 본인</option>
+                </optgroup>
+                <optgroup label="SQL · 정적 조건">
+                  <option value="STATIC_SQL">정적 SQL 조건식</option>
+                </optgroup>
               </select>
-              <input class="form-control" name="ruleValue" placeholder="비교 값">
+              <input class="form-control" name="ruleValue" maxlength="1000" placeholder="비교 값">
               <button class="btn btn-outline-secondary" type="button" data-rule-add>추가</button>
             </div>
           </div>
           <details class="explanation-details">
-            <summary>행 규칙과 기술 태그 OR 조건 보기</summary>
+            <summary>행 규칙의 두 가지 적용 방식 보기</summary>
-            <p class="wizard-hint">특정 기술 태그는 기본적으로 <code>TECH_TAG</code> 컬럼을 봅니다. 같은 ALLOW 권한에 태그를 여러 개 추가하면 “태그 A 또는 태그 B”로 조회됩니다. 이해당사자 규칙은 <strong>비교 컬럼</strong>과 <strong>업무 역할값</strong>(예: 설계사, 지점장)을 모두 입력하세요. 토큰을 해석한 뒤 <code>STAKEHOLDER_USER_ID</code>·<code>STAKEHOLDER_ROLE</code>·<code>STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL</code> context를 사용합니다. <code>STAKEHOLDER_SELF</code>은 <code>c.FC_ID = context 사용자</code>, <code>STAKEHOLDER_CHANNEL</code>은 <code>c.FC_CHANNEL = context 채널</code>이며 서로 다른 허용 규칙은 OR로 결합됩니다.</p>
+            <p class="wizard-hint"><strong>조건 코드</strong>는 토큰 context로 치환됩니다. 예를 들어 <code>본인 담당 고객 / CUST_ID</code>는 계약원장에서 토큰 사용자 ID의 담당 고객을 찾아 현재 객체의 <code>CUST_ID</code>에 적용합니다. <strong>정적 SQL 조건식</strong>은 <code>CONTRACT_STATUS = '정상'</code>처럼 현재 객체 컬럼을 사용한 WHERE 절을 그대로 추가합니다. 한 권한 안의 규칙은 모두 AND로 좁혀지고, 서로 다른 역할의 ALLOW 권한은 OR로 합쳐집니다. 역할명은 VPD WHERE 절에 직접 들어가지 않습니다.</p>
           </details>
         </div>
       </div>
@@ -241,7 +242,7 @@
 
   <section class="content-band">
     <h2>접근 규칙 목록</h2>
-    <p class="section-subtitle">같은 보호 대상에 적용되는 ALLOW 역할 분기와 한 권한 안의 여러 행 규칙은 OR로 합칩니다. 예를 들어 설계사 본인계약 분기 또는 지점장 채널 분기 중 하나라도 성립하면 행이 허용됩니다. DENY 분기는 허용 결과에서 별도로 제외됩니다.</p>
+    <p class="section-subtitle">한 접근 규칙 안에서는 조건 코드와 정적 SQL 조건을 AND로 합쳐 범위를 좁힙니다. 같은 보호 대상의 서로 다른 ALLOW 권한은 OR, DENY 권한은 허용 결과에서 제외됩니다.</p>
     <div class="table-responsive">
       <table class="table table-sm align-middle permission-list-table">
         <thead>

src/test/java/com/cloudhandson/vpdbackoffice/service/PermissionServiceTest.java

@@ -221,6 +221,83 @@ class PermissionServiceTest {
         .hasMessageContaining("값이 필요");
   }
 
+  @Test
+  void acceptsKbFilterConditionCodesWithoutAStaticRuleValue() {
+    var command = new PermissionSetCommand(
+        10L,
+        1L,
+        "SELECT",
+        "ALLOW",
+        List.of(
+            new RuleCommand("DEPT_CODE", "OWN_CONTRACT", null),
+            new RuleCommand("OWNER_EMP_NO", "CHANNEL_CUSTOMER", null)
+        ),
+        List.of()
+    );
+
+    permissionService.savePermissionSet(command);
+
+    FakePermissionMapper mapper = (FakePermissionMapper) permissionMapper;
+    assertThat(mapper.insertedRules)
+        .extracting(PermissionRule::ruleType)
+        .containsExactly("OWN_CONTRACT", "CHANNEL_CUSTOMER");
+    assertThat(mapper.insertedRules)
+        .extracting(PermissionRule::ruleValue)
+        .containsExactly("", "");
+  }
+
+  @Test
+  void acceptsStaticSqlPredicateAlongsideAContextCondition() {
+    var command = new PermissionSetCommand(
+        10L,
+        1L,
+        "SELECT",
+        "ALLOW",
+        List.of(
+            new RuleCommand("DEPT_CODE", "OWN_CONTRACT", null),
+            new RuleCommand(null, "STATIC_SQL", "DEPT_CODE IN ('HR', 'FIN')")
+        ),
+        List.of()
+    );
+
+    permissionService.savePermissionSet(command);
+
+    FakePermissionMapper mapper = (FakePermissionMapper) permissionMapper;
+    assertThat(mapper.insertedRules)
+        .extracting(PermissionRule::ruleType)
+        .containsExactly("OWN_CONTRACT", "STATIC_SQL");
+    assertThat(mapper.insertedRules)
+        .extracting(PermissionRule::ruleValue)
+        .containsExactly("", "DEPT_CODE IN ('HR', 'FIN')");
+  }
+
+  @Test
+  void rejectsStaticSqlStatementOrUnknownColumn() {
+    var statementCommand = new PermissionSetCommand(
+        10L,
+        1L,
+        "SELECT",
+        "ALLOW",
+        List.of(new RuleCommand(null, "STATIC_SQL", "DEPT_CODE = 'HR'; DELETE FROM CB_APP_USER")),
+        List.of()
+    );
+    var unknownColumnCommand = new PermissionSetCommand(
+        10L,
+        1L,
+        "SELECT",
+        "ALLOW",
+        List.of(new RuleCommand(null, "STATIC_SQL", "UNSUPPORTED_COLUMN = 'HR'")),
+        List.of()
+    );
+
+    assertThatThrownBy(() -> permissionService.savePermissionSet(statementCommand))
+        .isInstanceOf(AppException.class)
+        .hasMessageContaining("단일 WHERE");
+    assertThatThrownBy(() -> permissionService.savePermissionSet(unknownColumnCommand))
+        .isInstanceOf(AppException.class)
+        .hasMessageContaining("보호 객체 컬럼");
+  }
+
   @Test
   void acceptsMultipleVisibleColumns() {
     var command = new PermissionSetCommand(

src/test/java/com/cloudhandson/vpdbackoffice/web/GuidedFlowTemplateTest.java

@@ -157,14 +157,16 @@ class GuidedFlowTemplateTest {
   }
 
   @Test
-  void permissionWizardExplainsTagRulesAndOrSemantics() throws IOException {
+  void permissionWizardExplainsConditionCodeAndStaticSqlSemantics() throws IOException {
     String html = template("permissions.html");
     String javascript = Files.readString(Path.of("src/main/resources/static/js/app.js"));
 
     assertThat(html)
-        .contains("value=\"TAG\">특정 기술 태그")
+        .contains("value=\"OWN_CUSTOMER\">본인 담당 고객")
-        .contains("TECH_TAG")
+        .contains("value=\"STATIC_SQL\">정적 SQL 조건식")
-        .contains("태그를 여러 개 추가하면")
+        .contains("행 규칙의 두 가지 적용 방식 보기")
+        .contains("한 권한 안의 규칙은 모두 AND")
+        .contains("서로 다른 역할의 ALLOW 권한은 OR")
         .contains("data-wizard-validation")
         .contains("다른 조건 규칙은 한 권한에 함께 저장할 수 없습니다")
         .contains("저장 영향")